Private Patent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth
Private Patent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth
复制标题
熊彼特增长理论中的私人专利保护
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1750393
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
M. Şener
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Lewis Davis;M. Şener
我们开发了一个熊彼特增长模型与私人最佳的知识产权（IPRs）的执法和调查的知识产权和R&D政策的影响。在我们的环境中，成功的创新者采取昂贵的租金保护活动（RPA）来执行他们的专利。RPA阻止了那些寻求发现更高质量产品从而取代专利保持器的创新者。保护区还阻止了那些试图通过模仿专利保持器的产品来占领一部分垄断市场的模仿者。我们通过考虑对RPA的补贴对经济增长和福利的影响来调查私人知识产权保护的作用。我们发现，一个更大的RPA补贴提高创新率，当且仅当模仿的容易程度高于一定的水平。关于福利，我们发现，根据参数，它可能是最佳的税收或补贴RPA。因此，对区域保护区征收过高的税不一定是最佳的。我们还表明，模仿的存在加强了补贴R&D的情况。
We develop a Schumpeterian growth model with privately optimal intellectual property rights (IPRs) enforcement and investigate the implications for intellectual property and R&D policies. In our setting, successful innovators undertake costly rent protection activities (RPAs) to enforce their patents. RPAs deter innovators who seek to discover higher quality products and thereby replace the patent holder. RPAs also deter imitators who seek to capture a portion of the monopoly market by imitating the patent holder's product. We investigate the role of private IPR protection by considering the impact of subsidies to RPAs on economic growth and welfare. We find that a larger RPA subsidy raises the innovation rate if and only if the ease of imitation is above a certain level. With regards to welfare, we find that depending on the parameters it may be optimal to tax or subsidize RPAs. Thus a prohibitively high taxation of RPAs is not necessarily optimal. We also show that the presence of imitation strengthens the case for subsidizing R&D.
影响因子：
1.7
作者：
Ryo Horii;Tatsuro Iwaisako
通讯作者：
Ryo Horii;Tatsuro Iwaisako