Measuring and Evading Turkmenistan’s Internet Censorship: A Case Study in Large-Scale Measurements of a Low-Penetration Country
Measuring and Evading Turkmenistan’s Internet Censorship: A Case Study in Large-Scale Measurements of a Low-Penetration Country
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测量和规避土库曼斯坦的互联网审查：低渗透率国家大规模测量的案例研究
DOI：
10.1145/3543507.3583189
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发表时间：
2023
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Levin, Dave
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Nourin, Sadia;Tran, Van;Jiang, Xi;Bock, Kevin;Feamster, Nick;Hoang, Nguyen Phong;Levin, Dave
自2006年以来，土库曼斯坦一直被无国界记者组织列为少数几个互联网敌人之一，因为其广泛的互联网审查和严格监管的信息控制政策。土库曼斯坦现有的过滤报告依赖于少数Vantage位置或测试少数网站。然而，该国互联网采用率低，人口少，这使得更全面的衡量具有挑战性。土库曼斯坦的人口只有600万，互联网普及率只有38%，招募国内志愿者或获得Vantage位置进行大规模远程网络测量是一项挑战。我们介绍了迄今为止土库曼斯坦网络审查的最大测量研究。为此，我们开发了TMC，它可以测试Web三大基础协议（DNS、HTTP和HTTPS）上数百万个域的阻塞状态。重要的是，TMC不需要进入该国的Vantage位置。我们将TMC应用于1550万个域名，我们的结果显示土库曼斯坦审查了超过122K个域名，对每个协议使用不同的阻止列表。我们还对这些被审查的域进行了反向工程，确定了6K个过度阻塞规则，导致超过540万个域的附带过滤。最后，我们使用，一个开源的审查规避工具，发现五个新的审查规避策略，可以击败土库曼斯坦的审查在运输和应用层。我们将公开发布TMC收集的数据和规避审查的代码。
Since 2006, Turkmenistan has been listed as one of the few Internet enemies by Reporters without Borders due to its extensively censored Internet and strictly regulated information control policies. Existing reports of filtering in Turkmenistan rely on a handful of vantage points or test a small number of websites. Yet, the country’s poor Internet adoption rates and small population can make more comprehensive measurement challenging. With a population of only six million people and an Internet penetration rate of only 38%, it is challenging to either recruit in-country volunteers or obtain vantage points to conduct remote network measurements at scale.We present the largest measurement study to date of Turkmenistan’s Web censorship. To do so, we developed TMC, which tests the blocking status of millions of domains across the three foundational protocols of the Web (DNS, HTTP, and HTTPS). Importantly, TMC does not require access to vantage points in the country. We apply TMC to 15.5M domains, our results reveal that Turkmenistan censors more than 122K domains, using different blocklists for each protocol. We also reverse-engineer these censored domains, identifying 6K over-blocking rules causing incidental filtering of more than 5.4M domains. Finally, we use , an open-source censorship evasion tool, to discover five new censorship evasion strategies that can defeat Turkmenistan’s censorship at both transport and application layers. We will publicly release both the data collected by TMC and the code for censorship evasion.
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