Yardstick Competition and Policy Learning in Multi-level Systems

Yardstick Competition and Policy Learning in Multi-level Systems
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多层次系统中的标尺竞争和政策学习

DOI:
10.1080/13597566.2012.688270
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发表时间:
2012
影响因子:
1.4
通讯作者:
Arthur
Arthur
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Arthur

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社会科学家普遍认为,政府间竞争可以促进政策学习,并可以激励政府效仿创新和成功的做法。然而,这个假设必须是有条件的。被称为“标准竞争”的程序有望实现政策学习和转移,而不是市场力量推动各国政府争夺流动纳税人。在这种情况下,政府参与对其表现的比较评估,并试图提高其在排名中的相对位置,或更接近最佳做法。虽然理论推理为这一假设提供了令人信服的理由,但在实践中,政府必须满足不同的条件才能学习。必须组织标准竞赛,但程序和评估常常存在争议。政府必须愿意参与,除非我们知道它们竞争的动机是什么,否则这一点不能被视为理所当然。根据理论,议会或选民可以推动高管们遵守最佳做法。但议会成员或选民经常受到政党竞争或其管辖范围内的媒体辩论的引导,而对其他政府的所作所为不太感兴趣。本文讨论了阻碍或促进成功的标准竞争和政策学习的条件。实证证据基于对德国区域间政策竞争的研究。
Social scientists widely agree that intergovernmental competition can stimulate policy learning and can motivate governments to emulate innovative and successful practices. However, this assumption has to be qualified. Rather than market forces driving governments to compete for mobile tax payers, procedures known as ‘yardstick competition’ promise to achieve policy learning and transfer. In this case, governments participate in comparative evaluation of their performance and try to improve their relative position in rankings or come closer to best practices. While theoretical reasoning provides convincing reasons for this assumption, in practice different conditions have to be met to make governments learn. Yardstick competition has to be organized, but procedures and evaluations are often disputed. Governments have to be willing to participate, which cannot be taken for granted unless we know what motivates them to compete. According to theory, parliaments or voters can drive executives to meet best practices. But members of parliaments or voters are regularly guided by party competition or by media debates inside their jurisdiction and less interested in what other governments do. The article discusses conditions that can impede or promote successful yardstick competition and policy learning. Empirical evidence is based on studies of inter-regional policy competition in Germany.
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