Information Elicitation from Rowdy Crowds
Information Elicitation from Rowdy Crowds
复制标题
从喧闹的人群中获取信息
DOI:
10.1145/3442381.3449840
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发表时间:
2021
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Zhang, Yichi
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Schoenebeck, Grant;Yu, Fang-Yi;Zhang, Yichi
We initiate the study of information elicitation mechanisms for a crowd containing both self-interested agents, who respond to incentives, and adversarial agents, who may collude to disrupt the system. Our mechanisms work in the peer prediction setting where ground truth need not be accessible to the mechanism or even exist.We provide a meta-mechanism that reduces the design of peer prediction mechanisms to a related robust learning problem. The resulting mechanisms are ϵ-informed truthful, which means truth-telling is the highest paid ϵ-Bayesian Nash equilibrium (up to ϵ-error) and pays strictly more than uninformative equilibria. The value of ϵ depends on the properties of robust learning algorithm, and typically limits to 0 as the number of tasks and agents increase.We show how to use our meta-mechanism to design mechanisms with provable guarantees in two important crowdsourcing settings even when some agents are self-interested and others are adversarial.
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DOI:
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发表时间:
2011
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
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通讯作者:
A. DeVries
DOI:
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发表时间:
2019
期刊:
ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
影响因子:
--
作者:
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通讯作者:
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发表时间:
2016
期刊:
ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.
影响因子:
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作者:
Yuqing Kong;G. Schoenebeck
通讯作者:
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发表时间:
2021
期刊:
12th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2021
影响因子:
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作者:
Schoenebeck, Grant;Yu, Fang-Yi
通讯作者:
Yu, Fang-Yi
DOI:
10.4230/lipics.itcs.2018.47
发表时间:
2017
期刊:
2017 IEEE International Conference on Computer Vision (ICCV)
影响因子:
--
作者:
Mingda Qiao;G. Valiant
通讯作者:
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