Saving the intuitions: polylithic reference
Saving the intuitions: polylithic reference
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保存直觉：多片参考
DOI：
10.1007/s11229-009-9601-1
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
Votsis
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Votsis
我在本文中的主要目的是澄清对科学实在论辩论至关重要的参照成功和参照连续性的概念。我首先考虑了三种主要的指称理论以及激发它们的直觉。由于支持一种理论的几个直觉与支持另一种理论的几个直觉相冲突，就必须做出让步。传统的政策是拒绝所有与选定理论相冲突的直觉。一些实验哲学家提出了一种更为激进的政策，要求拒绝直觉的任何证据作用。我探索了很大程度上被忽视的第三种选择，即即使直觉（及其证据作用）不一致，也要保留直觉。为了适应相互冲突的直觉，不同的内部一致（但外部不一致）的直觉被用来为不同的参考概念提供信任。在当前的背景下，这意味着参考成功和参考连续性的概念不是单一的。它们就是我所说的“多石”。这篇论文是关于直觉作用的元哲学关注，因为它是关于参考和科学实在论的辩论。关于前者，我希望在其他哲学领域中出现类似项目的蓝图。关于后者，我希望通过明确哪些概念最适合评估现实主义对科学历史记录的认识论主张，多重性有助于理清科学现实主义辩论中关于参照成功和连续性的主张。
My main aim in this paper is to clarify the concepts of referential success and of referential continuity that are so crucial to the scientific realism debate. I start by considering the three dominant theories of reference and the intuitions that motivate each of them. Since several intuitions cited in support of one theory conflict with intuitions cited in support of another something has to give way. The traditional policy has been to reject all intuitions that clash with a chosen theory. A more radical policy, tied to some experimental philosophers, has called for the rejection of any evidential role for intuitions. I explore a largely ignored third alternative, i.e. saving intuitions (and their evidential role) even when they are at odds. To accommodate conflicting intuitions different sets of internally consistent (yet externally inconsistent) intuitions are taken to lend credence to different concepts of reference. In the current context, this means that the concepts of referential success and referential continuity are not monolithic. They are what I call ‘polylithic’. This paper is as much about meta-philosophical concerns with the role of intuitions as it is about reference and the scientific realism debate. Regarding the former I hope that a blueprint will emerge for similar projects in other philosophical domains. Regarding the latter, I hope that polylithicity helps disentangle claims about referential success and continuity in the scientific realism debate by making perspicuous which concepts are best equipped to evaluate the realist’s epistemic claims against the historical record of science.
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DOI：
--
发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
--
作者：
M. Friedman
通讯作者：
M. Friedman
影响因子：
1.7
作者：
Psillos, Stathis
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Psillos, Stathis
科学现实主义的惨痛胜利
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
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作者：
P. Stanford
通讯作者：
P. Stanford
科学研究计划的方法论：简介：科学与伪科学
DOI：
--
发表时间：
1978
期刊：
影响因子：
--
作者：
I. Lakatos;J. Worrall;G. Currie
通讯作者：
G. Currie
意义与道德科学
DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-0149.1979.tb02691.x
发表时间：
1979
期刊：
Philosophical Books
影响因子：
--
作者：
B. Mayo
通讯作者：
B. Mayo