Information, Asymmetric Incentives, Or Withholding? Understanding the Self-Enforcement of Value-Added Tax
Information, Asymmetric Incentives, Or Withholding? Understanding the Self-Enforcement of Value-Added Tax
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信息、不对称激励，还是扣留？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Mazhar Waseem
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Mazhar Waseem
1996年至2000年期间，巴基斯坦增值税的覆盖范围（按税网中的公司数量计算）增加了20倍，按交易量计算（按增值税计算）增加了10倍。本文利用该国增值税的交错征收来估计其执法溢出效应。我着眼于已经在税网中的公司，探讨了随着增值税扩展到其贸易伙伴，他们的税务合规性是否会得到改善。我利用对税收向上和向下延伸的不同反应，描述了自我执行反应背后的机制。
During the period 1996-2000, the coverage of VAT in Pakistan rose by twenty times in terms of the number of firms in the tax net and by ten times in terms of the volume of transactions subject to it. This paper leverages this staggered introduction of VAT in the country to estimate its enforcement spillovers. Focusing on firms already in the tax net, I explore if their tax compliance improves as VAT gets extended to their trading partners. Using differential responses to upward and downward extension of the tax, I characterize the mechanisms underlying the self-enforcement response.
影响因子：
8.2
作者：
Michael Best;Anne Brockmeyer;H. Kleven;Johannes Spinnewijn;Mazhar Waseem
通讯作者：
Michael Best;Anne Brockmeyer;H. Kleven;Johannes Spinnewijn;Mazhar Waseem
增值税缺口、自愿注册和捆绑：理论和英国证据
DOI：
10.1162/rest_a_00884
发表时间：
2021
期刊：
The Review of Economics and Statistics
影响因子：
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作者：
Liu L
通讯作者：
Liu L