Dynamic procurement management by reverse auctions with fixed setup costs and sales levers
Dynamic procurement management by reverse auctions with fixed setup costs and sales levers
复制标题
通过具有固定设置成本和销售杠杆的逆向拍卖进行动态采购管理
DOI:
10.1016/j.apm.2015.10.008
复制
发表时间:
2016-02
影响因子:
5
通讯作者:
Hu, Qiying
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Liu, Shuren;Zhu, Yimin;Hu, Qiying
In this paper, we study a dynamic procurement problem for a retailer with fixed setup costs and sales levers (such as pricing, advertising, etc.). The retailer runs a reverse auction with a procurement contract in each period. A number of potential suppliers bid for this contract, and the winner is the supplier with the highest bid and is given the decision right for the quantity produced and delivered. The demand is either realized by selling via Internet auctions and unmet demand is lost, or is a price-sensitive nonnegative random variable and all shortages are backlogged. We show the existence of the retailer’s optimal procurement contract, under which the suppliers’ Bayesian–Nash equilibrium bidding strategy is (q (·), Q (·)), similar to the classic (s, S) policy for the retailers in dynamic inventory control problems. However, the (q (·), Q (·)) strategy here is for the suppliers and is realized through the suppliers’ marginal production costs and so consists of two random variables for the retailer.
登录
查看更多内容
影响因子:
1.7
作者:
MYERSON, RB
通讯作者:
MYERSON, RB
影响因子:
2.3
作者:
Chen, YH;Ray, S;Song, YY
通讯作者:
Song, YY
DOI:
10.1287/msom.1100.0319
发表时间:
2011-03-01
影响因子:
6.3
作者:
Chaturvedi, Aadhaar;Martinez-de-Albeniz, Victor
通讯作者:
Martinez-de-Albeniz, Victor
影响因子:
4.8
作者:
Pooya Farahvash;T. Altiok
通讯作者:
Pooya Farahvash;T. Altiok
DOI:
10.1287/opre.1100.0862
发表时间:
2011
期刊:
Oper. Res.
影响因子:
--
作者:
P. Berling;Víctor Martínez-de-Albéniz
通讯作者:
P. Berling;Víctor Martínez-de-Albéniz