Platform Oligopoly with Endogenous Homing: Implications for Free Entry and Mergers
Platform Oligopoly with Endogenous Homing: Implications for Free Entry and Mergers
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具有内生归巢的平台寡头垄断：对自由进入和合并的影响
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3937682
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发表时间：
2021
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
M. Tremblay
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Takanori Adachi;Susumu Sato;M. Tremblay
消费者多宿主被认为是数字平台竞争政策的关键。为了评估消费者多归属在平台竞争政策中的作用，我们开发了一个新的框架，将双边市场中的消费者多归属嵌入到古诺寡头垄断的标准模型中，并将其应用于自由进入和合并。我们发现，考虑到消费者多归属的存在，平台进入的均衡水平是不够的，如果多归属消费者的比例较大，则所需的合并特定成本降低水平也较大。这些结果一起提供了一个警告，以流行的信念，多归属减轻了需要严格执行竞争政策。
Consumer multi-homing is considered to be critical for competition policy regarding digital platforms. To assess the role of consumer multi-homing in competition policy toward platforms, we develop a new framework that embeds consumer multi-homing in two-sided market into the otherwise standard model of Cournot oligopoly and apply it to free entry and mergers. We find that the equilibrium level of platform entry is insufficient given the presence of consumer multi-homing, and a required level of merger-specific cost reduction is larger if the fraction of multi-homing consumers is larger. These results together provide a caution to the popular belief that multi-homing mitigates the need for a strict implementation of competition policy.
影响因子：
8.2
作者：
Volker Nocke;M. Whinston
通讯作者：
Volker Nocke;M. Whinston