Monopoly Pricing, Optimal Randomization, and Resale
Monopoly Pricing, Optimal Randomization, and Resale
复制标题
垄断定价、最优随机化和转售
DOI：
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发表时间：
2021
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
Ellen V. Muir
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. Loertscher;Ellen V. Muir
We provide a parsimonious and unified explanation for randomized selling mechanisms widely used in practice yet commonly perceived as puzzling. Optimality of randomization in the form of conflation and rationing implies that revenue under market-clearing pricing is nonconcave. Randomization is implementable via opaque pricing and underpricing. Relative to market-clearing pricing, randomization increases the equilibrium quantity and quality of goods sold and, consequently, may increase consumer surplus. For fixed quantities, resale increases consumer surplus. However, resale can decrease the equilibrium quantity and quality of goods sold. Thus, resale prohibition, which always benefits the seller, may also increase consumer surplus.
DOI：
10.1145/2764468.2764539
发表时间：
2014-09
期刊：
Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
影响因子：
--
作者：
C. Daskalakis;Alan Deckelbaum;Christos Tzamos
通讯作者：
C. Daskalakis;Alan Deckelbaum;Christos Tzamos
现实世界讨价还价的效率：来自二手车批发拍卖的证据
DOI：
10.1093/restud/rdaa007
发表时间：
2020
期刊：
The Review of Economic Studies
影响因子：
--
作者：
Larsen, Bradley J
通讯作者：
Larsen, Bradley J
入境阻止机构
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.012
发表时间：
2020
期刊：
Games Econ. Behav.
影响因子：
--
作者：
Loertscher;Andras Niedermayer
通讯作者：
Andras Niedermayer