The Efficiency of Real-World Bargaining: Evidence from Wholesale Used-Auto Auctions

The Efficiency of Real-World Bargaining: Evidence from Wholesale Used-Auto Auctions
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现实世界讨价还价的效率:来自二手车批发拍卖的证据

DOI:
10.1093/restud/rdaa007
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发表时间:
2020
期刊:
The Review of Economic Studies
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Larsen, Bradley J
Larsen, Bradley J
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Larsen, Bradley J

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本研究实证量化了双边不完全信息下现实世界讨价还价博弈的效率。Myerson and Satterthwaite(1983)和威廉姆斯(1987)推导出双边贸易在双边不确定性条件下的理论事前有效边界,并证明其福尔斯低于事后效率,但对讨价还价在实践中的表现知之甚少。使用大约265,000序列的交替报价讨价还价的游戏后,在批发二手车行业的上升拍卖,本研究估计(或边界)分布的买方和卖方的价值和评估实现的讨价还价的结果在于相对于有效的结果。结果表明,事前和事后有效的结果是相互接近的,但真实的讨价还价福尔斯却达不到这两个结果,这表明讨价还价确实是无效的,但这种无效不仅仅是由于迈尔森和萨特思韦特(1983)强调的信息约束。从数量上看,调查结果表明,超过一半的失败谈判是存在贸易收益的情况下,导致效率损失的12-23%的贸易收益。
This study empirically quantifies the efficiency of a real-world bargaining game with two-sided incomplete information. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and Williams (1987) derived the theoretical ex-ante efficient frontier for bilateral trade under two-sided uncertainty and demonstrated that it falls short of ex-post efficiency, but little is known about how well bargaining performs in practice. Using about 265,000 sequences of a game of alternating-offer bargaining following an ascending auction in the wholesale used-car industry, this study estimates (or bounds) distributions of buyer and seller values and evaluates where realized bargaining outcomes lie relative to efficient outcomes. Results demonstrate that the ex-ante and ex-post efficient outcomes are close to one another, but that the real bargaining falls short of both, suggesting that the bargaining is indeed inefficient but that this inefficiency is not solely due to the information constraints highlighted in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983). Quantitatively, findings indicate that over one-half of failed negotiations are cases where gains from trade exist, leading an efficiency loss of 12–23% of the available gains from trade.
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