Reconstruction methodology for rational secret sharing based on mechanism design
Reconstruction methodology for rational secret sharing based on mechanism design
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基于机制设计的合理秘密共享重构方法
DOI：
10.1007/s11432-015-9066-9
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发表时间：
2017-06
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Guo Jingjing
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Liu Hai;Li Xinghua;Ma Jianfeng;Xu Mengfan;Guo Jingjing
理性秘密共享[1]是博弈论[2]和传统秘密共享[3]的交叉。在理性的秘密分享中，参与者是自私的，总是按照利润最大化的原则行事。这首先意味着理性的玩家更喜欢获得秘密而不是不获得，其次，玩家更喜欢尽可能少的其他参与者获得秘密。理性参与者出于自私的动机，在重构阶段要么保持沉默，要么发送不正确的份额，从而使得理性秘密重构的公平性和正确性变得难以实现。基于上述原因，现有的研究集中在设计不同的重构协议，以约束理性参与者的自私性，并在重构秘密时成功地实现公平和正确。然而，博弈论以及现有的研究缺乏一个指导性的参考模型来约束理性参与者的自私。设计合理的秘密重构协议一直依赖于设计者的经验。虽然在没有参考模型的情况下已经提出了许多有趣而巧妙的理性秘密重构协议，但一些研究人员[4-6]确实指出这些协议在两个不同方面可能是不充分的：(1)终端策略配置文件是不公平的；(2)所获得的秘密是不正确的。针对上述问题，本文从微观经济学的角度引入了机制设计[7]，并提出了一个参考模型，以期设计出合理的秘密重构协议。在该方案中，对理性秘密重构博弈进行了形式化描述，并从设计者的角度，考虑了理性秘密共享的安全性、正确性和公平性，讨论了该博弈的预期目标。最后，在机构设计的基础上，定义了合理的秘密重构设计模型。通过这一简单的分析，我们表明所提出的模型能够帮助设计者在合理的秘密重构方面实现公平性和正确性。理性秘密重构博弈。在广泛形式的游戏[2]中，当需要做出决定时，每个参与者在任何时间点都会考虑自己的行动计划。因此，为了投射理性秘密重构协议的执行，我们在扩展形式博弈的基础上对理性秘密重构博弈进行了形式化。
Rational secret sharing [1] is the intersection of game theory [2] and traditional secret sharing [3]. In rational secret sharing, the players are selfish and always behave in accordance with profit maximization. What this implies, primarily, is that rational players prefer obtaining the secret rather than not obtaining it and, secondarily, that players prefer as few other players as possible obtaining the secret. Motivated by selfishness, rational players either keep silent or send incorrect shares during the reconstruction phase, thereby the fairness and correctness of rational secret reconstruction become difficult to achieve. For the reasons mentioned above, existing investigations have focused on devising different reconstruction protocols, in order to restrict the selfishness of rational players and succeed in achieving fairness and correctness when reconstructing secrets. However, Game theory as well as existing investigations lacks a guideline reference model that is restrictive to the selfishness of rational players. Devising rational secret reconstruction protocols has always relied on the designers’ experience. Although many interesting and ingenious rational secret reconstruction protocols have been presented in the absence of a reference model, some researchers [4–6] do point out that such protocols are likely to be inadequate in two different ways: (1) the terminal strategy profile is unfair; and (2) the obtained secret is incorrect. To address the aforementioned problems, this article introduces mechanism design [7] from the field of microeconomics, and proposes a reference model for the purpose of devising rational secret reconstruction protocols. In the proposal, the rational secret reconstruction game is formalized; then, the expected goal of this game is discussed from the designer’s perspective and with consideration to the security, correctness and fairness of rational secret sharing. Finally, the rational secret reconstruction design model is defined on the basis of mechanism design. Through this brief analysis, we indicate that the proposed model is able to assist the designer in achieving fairness and correctness, with regard to rational secret reconstruction. Rational secret reconstruction game. In the extensive form game [2], each player considers his plan of action, at any point in time, when a decision needs to be made. Therefore, to cast the execution of rational secret reconstruction protocols, we formalize the rational secret reconstruction game based on the extensive form game.
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DOI：
10.2307/136062
发表时间：
1995-08
期刊：
--
影响因子：
--
作者：
M. Osborne;Ariel Rubinstein
通讯作者：
M. Osborne;Ariel Rubinstein
DOI：
10.1007/978-0-387-30162-4_9
发表时间：
2008
期刊：
--
影响因子：
--
作者：
Ron Lavi
通讯作者：
Ron Lavi
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-319-02937-5_8
发表时间：
2013-11
期刊：
--
影响因子：
--
作者：
S. De;A. K. Pal
通讯作者：
S. De;A. K. Pal
影响因子：
3
作者：
Gilad Asharov;Yehuda Lindell
通讯作者：
Gilad Asharov;Yehuda Lindell
影响因子：
22.7
作者：
SHAMIR, A
通讯作者：
SHAMIR, A