PATENT PROTECTION, OPTIMAL LICENSING, AND INNOVATION WITH ENDOGENOUS ENTRY
PATENT PROTECTION, OPTIMAL LICENSING, AND INNOVATION WITH ENDOGENOUS ENTRY
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专利保护、最佳许可以及内源性创新
DOI:
10.1017/s1365100519000099
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发表时间:
2019
影响因子:
0.9
通讯作者:
Suzuki Keishun
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Aoyagi Masaki;Masuda Takehito;Nishimura Naoko;小阪 真也;Yasushi Agatsuma;Yusuke Kasuya;Suzuki Keishun
How does patent policy affect innovation when patent licensing is crucial for firms? To address this question, the present study incorporates voluntary patent licensing between an innovator and followers, as discussed in the literature of industrial organization, into a dynamic general equilibrium model. Unlike previous studies, both the licensing fee and the number of licensees are endogenously determined by the innovator’s maximization and the free-entry condition. Using this model, we show that strong patent protection does not always enhance innovation, economic growth, and welfare. Furthermore, the extended analysis provides the policy implication that the effect of patent policy depends on how difficult further innovation is without patent licensing of the current leading technology.
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影响因子:
1.7
作者:
Ryo Horii;Tatsuro Iwaisako
通讯作者:
Ryo Horii;Tatsuro Iwaisako
DOI:
10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.08.001
发表时间:
2018
期刊:
Math. Soc. Sci.
影响因子:
--
作者:
D. Sen;Y. Tauman
通讯作者:
Y. Tauman
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-540-87427-0_3
发表时间:
2009
期刊:
--
影响因子:
--
作者:
Federico Etro
通讯作者:
Federico Etro
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2392337
发表时间:
2010
期刊:
Environment for Innovation eJournal
影响因子:
--
作者:
R. Cysne;David Turchick
通讯作者:
David Turchick
影响因子:
1.3
作者:
Simone Marsiglio;M. Tolotti
通讯作者:
M. Tolotti