The Phenomenology and Ethics of P-Centricity in Mental Capacity Law
The Phenomenology and Ethics of P-Centricity in Mental Capacity Law
复制标题
心理能力法则中 P 中心的现象学和伦理学
DOI：
10.1007/s10982-022-09458-6
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发表时间：
2023
影响因子：
0.8
通讯作者：
Kong C
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kong C
根据英格兰和威尔士2005年《精神能力法》（MCA），对主观自由的自由承诺指导了对不缺乏能力的人的义务。对于可能缺乏行为能力的诉讼主体(P)，不太清楚的是什么义务引导代表他们的最佳利益的决策。英国最高法院强调了“以P为中心”在最佳利益决策中的中心地位，在最佳利益的整体考虑中有法律义务考虑P的主观观点和愿望。然而，在最大利益标准中，对P的亏欠仍然不明确，导致人们倾向于通过主观自治的规范性棱镜来解释P中心的义务。本文认为，这些举动减少了p中心精神所带来的复杂道德现象学。相反，道德可观性和承认尊重的现象学和伦理立场可以最好地捕捉心理能力法中以p为中心的决策的丰富规范基础。
Under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) in England and Wales, the liberal commitments to subjective freedom guide obligations towards persons who do not lack capacity. For the subject of proceedings who might lack capacity (P), it is less clear as to what obligations orient best interests decision-making on their behalf. The UK Supreme Court has emphasised the centrality of ‘P-centricity’ in best interests decision-making, where there is the legal obligation to consider P’s subjective views and wishes in a holistic consideration of best interests. Unclarity nonetheless persists as to what is owed to P in the best interests standard, leading to the tendency to interpret obligations of P-centricity through the normative prism of subjective autonomy. This paper argues that such moves reduce the complex moral phenomenology of what a P-centric ethos entails. Instead, the phenomenological and ethical stance of moral considerability and recognition respect can best capture the enriched normative grounding for P-centric decision-making in mental capacity law.
脆弱成人实验：将脆弱性置于成人保护法律和政策中。
影响因子：
2.3
作者：
Kirsty Keywood
通讯作者：
Kirsty Keywood
脆弱性管辖权：衡平法、Parens Patriae 和法院的固有管辖权
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
作者：
M. Hall
通讯作者：
M. Hall