Defying the ‘Juncker curse’: can reformist governments be re-elected?
Defying the ‘Juncker curse’: can reformist governments be re-elected?
复制标题
打破“容克诅咒”：改革派政府能否连任？
DOI：
10.1007/s10663-008-9093-0
复制
发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
Pietro Biroli
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Buti;A. Turrini;P. Noord;Pietro Biroli
European policy makers, notably in the euro area, seem to take for granted that the electorate will punish them for bold reform in product and labour markets. This may explain why progress in the euro area has been comparatively limited. This paper posits and, using a dataset for 21 OECD countries, shows that this fear of electoral backlashes is unfounded, provided that financial markets work well. The mechanisms involved are relatively straightforward: well functioning financial markets “bring forward” future yields of structural reform to the present, thus permitting to overcome possible short-run costs. As a result, the electorate tend to reward, not punish, reformist governments. This has important implications for the design of structural reform packages, with financial market reforms being an essential ingredient beside product and labour market reforms.
影响因子：
2.5
作者：
Beck, T;Clarke, G;Walsh, P
通讯作者：
Walsh, P