Do we reflect while performing skillful actions? Automaticity, control, and the perils of distraction

Do we reflect while performing skillful actions? Automaticity, control, and the perils of distraction
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我们在进行善巧的行动时是否进行反思?

DOI:
10.1080/09515089.2017.1325457
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发表时间:
2017
影响因子:
1.4
通讯作者:
J. Bermúdez
J. Bermúdez
中科院分区:
心理学4区
文献类型:
--
作者:
J. Bermúdez

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从我们的日常通勤到金牌得主的世界级表演,熟练的动作都具有细粒度的在线代理控制特征。对这种控制的合理解释是什么?有两种传统的候选理论:理智主义通过参照行为人的命题心理状态来解释熟练的代理控制;反智主义认为命题心理状态或反思过程是不必要的,因为熟练的行为完全由自动应对过程来解释。我研究了最近支持反智主义的三种心理现象的证据(压力下窒息、专家诱发的健忘症和专家虚构),并认为它既不支持传统的候选人,而是支持一种中间的注意力控制解释,根据这种说法,自上而下的、意图导向的注意力控制是熟练行动的必要组成部分。只有这种说法承认自动控制在熟练动作中的作用,以及需要高阶认知将自动过程串联成统一的、熟练的表现。这适用于一般的身体技巧动作,从世界级的专家表演到平凡的、习惯性的动作。注意控制说强调,意图要发挥自上而下的注意调节器的作用,行为体必须维持意图的激活;因此,需要反映整个性能。
Abstract From our everyday commuting to the gold medalist’s world-class performance, skillful actions are characterized by fine-grained, online agentive control. What is the proper explanation of such control? There are two traditional candidates: intellectualism explains skillful agentive control by reference to the agent’s propositional mental states; anti-intellectualism holds that propositional mental states or reflective processes are unnecessary since skillful action is fully accounted for by automatic coping processes. I examine the evidence for three psychological phenomena recently held to support anti-intellectualism (choking under pressure, expertise-induced amnesia, and expert confabulation) and argue that it supports neither traditional candidate, but an intermediate attention-control account, according to which the top-down, intention-directed control of attention is a necessary component of skillful action. Only this account recognizes both the role of automatic control in skilled action and the need for higher-order cognition to thread automatic processes together into a unified, skillful performance. This applies to bodily skillful action in general, from the world-class performance of experts to mundane, habitual action. The attention-control account stresses that, for intentions to play their role as top-down modulators of attention, agents must sustain the intention’s activation; hence, the need for reflecting throughout performance.
DOI: 10.1002/cne.902930211
发表时间: 1990-03-08
影响因子: 2.5
作者:
HUERTA, MF;KAAS, JH
通讯作者: KAAS, JH