The Impact of Elections on Cooperation: Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Uganda.
The Impact of Elections on Cooperation: Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Uganda.
复制标题
DOI:
10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00596.x
复制
发表时间:
2012-10-01
影响因子:
4.2
通讯作者:
Baldassarri D
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Grossman G;Baldassarri D
Communities often rely on sanctioning to induce public goods contributions. Past studies focus on how external agencies or peer sanctioning induce cooperation. In this article, we focus instead on the role played by centralized authorities, internal to the community. Combining “lab-in-the-field” experiments with observational data on 1,541 Ugandan farmers from 50 communities, we demonstrate the positive effect of internal centralized sanctioning authorities on cooperative behavior. We also show that the size of this effect depends on the political process by which authority is granted: subjects electing leaders contribute more to public goods than subjects who were assigned leaders through a lottery. To test the ecological validity of our findings, we relate farmers’ behavior in the experiment to their level of cooperation in their community organization. We show that deference to authority in the controlled setting predicts cooperative behavior in the farmers’ natural environment, in which they face a similar social dilemma.
登录
查看更多内容
DOI:
10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.060107.154037
发表时间:
2009-01-01
影响因子:
10.8
作者:
de Rooij, Eline A.;Green, Donald P.;Gerber, Alan S.
通讯作者:
Gerber, Alan S.
影响因子:
1.1
作者:
Eckel, Catherine C.;Fatas, Enrique;Wilson, Rick
通讯作者:
Wilson, Rick
影响因子:
2
作者:
Gelman, Andrew
通讯作者:
Gelman, Andrew
影响因子:
2.9
作者:
Cardenas, Juan Camilo;Carpenter, Jeffrey
通讯作者:
Carpenter, Jeffrey
影响因子:
2
作者:
Fischbacher, U;Gächter, S;Fehr, E
通讯作者:
Fehr, E