Are Donors Afraid of Core Costs? Economies of Scale and Contestability in Charity Markets*

Are Donors Afraid of Core Costs? Economies of Scale and Contestability in Charity Markets*
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捐助者是否害怕核心成本?

DOI:
10.1093/ej/uez006
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发表时间:
2019
期刊:
The Economic Journal
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Perroni C
Perroni C
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Perroni C

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我们研究了慈善市场的可持续性,在慈善市场中,非商业性、非营利的提供者通过增加规模回报的技术提供同质的集体商品。与营利性竞争的情况不同,慈善机构没有基于价格的销售合同,这意味着固定成本可以转化为进入壁垒,保护效率低下的现任者的地位;或者,相反,它们可以使效率低下的新来者有可能竞争效率更高的现任者的地位。来自实验室实验的证据表明,固定成本驱动的效率和感知风险之间的权衡可能导致技术采用效率低下。
We study contestability in charity markets where non-commercial, not-for-profit providers supply a homogeneous collective good through increasing-returns-to-scale technologies. Unlike in the case of for-profit competition, the absence of price-based sales contracts for charities means that fixed costs can translate into entry barriers, protecting the position of an inefficient incumbent; or, conversely, they can make it possible for inefficient newcomers to contest the position of a more efficient incumbent. Evidence from laboratory experiments show that fixed-cost driven tradeoffs between efficiency and perceived risk can lead to inefficient technology adoption.
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