Path-Disruption Games: Bribery and a Probabilistic Model
Path-Disruption Games: Bribery and a Probabilistic Model
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路径破坏博弈:贿赂和概率模型
DOI:
10.1007/s00224-016-9669-1
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发表时间:
2017
影响因子:
0.5
通讯作者:
A. Marple
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
A. Rey;J. Rothe;A. Marple
Path-disruption games, recently introduced by Bachrach and Porat, are coalitional games played on graphs where one or multiple adversaries each seeks to reach a given target vertex from a given source vertex, while a coalition of agents seeks to prevent that from happening by blocking every path from the source to the target for each adversary. These coalitional games model, for instance, security issues in computer networks. Inspired by bribery in voting, we introduce the notion of bribery for path-disruption games. We analyze the question of how hard it is to decide whether the adversaries can bribe some of the agents such that no coalition will form that blocks all paths for them. We show that this problem is NP-complete for a single adversary and complete for, the second level of the polynomial hierarchy, for the case of multiple adversaries. We also expand the model by allowing uncertainty about the targets: In probabilistic path-disruption games, we assign to each vertex the probability that an adversary wants to reach it, and we study the complexity of problems related to common solution concepts (such as the core and theε-core) and other properties of such games.
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影响因子:
1.9
作者:
P. Faliszewski;Y. Reisch;J. Rothe;L. Schend
通讯作者:
L. Schend
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-642-24873-3_19
发表时间:
2011
期刊:
ArXiv
影响因子:
--
作者:
Anja Rey;J. Rothe
通讯作者:
J. Rothe
DOI:
10.1016/s0022-0000(73)80031-5
发表时间:
1973
期刊:
J. Comput. Syst. Sci.
影响因子:
--
作者:
W. Savitch
通讯作者:
W. Savitch
影响因子:
1.1
作者:
Ildikó Schlotter;Piotr Faliszewski;Edith Elkind
通讯作者:
Edith Elkind
影响因子:
1.2
作者:
Anja Rey;J. Rothe;Hilmar Schadrack;Lena Schend
通讯作者:
Lena Schend