Internal Regulatory Variables and the Design of Human Motivation: A Computational and Evolutionary Approach
Internal Regulatory Variables and the Design of Human Motivation: A Computational and Evolutionary Approach
复制标题
内部调节变量和人类动机的设计：计算和进化方法
DOI：
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Daniel Sznycer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Tooby;L. Cosmides;Aaron Sell;D. Lieberman;Daniel Sznycer
内部调节变量和人类动机的设计：计算和进化方法。认知心理学和进化生物学都对大脑的作用提供了令人信服的观点，但它们之间存在根本的脱节。进化生物学告诉我们，我们的大脑进化为追求功利目标，这些目标促进了在祖先环境中的生存和繁殖。认知心理学告诉我们，我们的大脑包含感知机制，注意力，记忆，推理和学习，虽然不是绝对正确的，但至少会产生跟踪现实某些方面的知识。福多更进一步：他说认知的功能是“真实信念的基础“（Fodor，2000，第68页）。这听起来不错，直到你意识到问题所在。真正的信念本身并不包含关于如何去做的信息--什么值得重视，什么应该接近，什么应该避免。百科全书没有动机。价值不是世界的一种财产，有待发现。粪便并不令人厌恶--它令我们厌恶，但对粪蝇有吸引力。一个男人可能对许多女人都有性吸引力，但对他的妹妹却有性排斥。就像美一样，价值在于观看者的适应（西蒙斯，1995）。在我们的研究中，我们一直在解决的问题是如何将价值和动机的研究纳入认知科学的框架。这些探索有两个方面。第一个涉及推理和概念;第二个是一种新的思考动机的方式，这种方式既是计算的，也是基于进化生物学的。认知心理学中的一个共同观点，最有力地阐述了Fodor（2000），是推理和概念是为了获得真正的信念而设计的，所以他们的研究可以与动机的研究隔离开来-从所谓的意动机制，控制偏好，方法和回避。与这种观点形成鲜明对比的是，我们最早的推理研究是由进化博弈论的结果驱动的，进化博弈论模拟了意动（即，行为产生）机制。被赋予不同行为产生机制的代理人被允许相互作用，这些相互作用的收益决定了下一代中每个代理人（机制承载）的副本数量。这模拟了自然选择是如何工作的，允许人们看到哪些机制类型，哪些设计，将随着时间的推移而保留，哪些将从种群中淘汰。然后可以测试是否机制与.
Internal regulatory variables and the design of human motivation: A computational and evolutionary approach. Cognitive psychology and evolutionary biology both offer compelling visions of what the brain does, but there is a radical disconnect between them. Evolutionary biology tells us that we are beings whose brains evolved to pursue utilitarian goals, goals that promoted survival and reproduction in ancestral environments. Cognitive psychology tells us that our brains contain mechanisms of perception, 250 Handbook of Approach and Avoidance Motivation attention, memory, reasoning, and learning that, while not infallible, produce knowledge that tracks at least some aspects of reality. Fodor goes even further: he says that the function of cognition is " the fi xation of true beliefs " (Fodor, 2000, p. 68). This sounds fi ne, until you realize the problem. True beliefs, by themselves, contain no information about how to behave—what to value, what to approach, what to avoid. Encyclopedias have no motivations. Value is not a property of the world, there to be discovered. Dung is not disgusting—it is disgusting to us, but attractive to dung fl ies. A man may be sexually attractive to many women, but sexually repulsive to his sister. Like beauty, value is in the adaptations of the beholder (Symons, 1995). The question we have been addressing in our research is how to incorporate the study of value and motivation into the framework of the cognitive sciences. There have been two strands to these explorations. The fi rst involves reasoning and concepts; the second is a new way of thinking about motivation that is both computational and grounded in evolutionary biology. A common view in cognitive psychology, most forcefully articulated by Fodor (2000), is that reasoning and concepts are designed for acquiring true beliefs, so their study can be walled off from the study of motivation—from so-called conative mechanisms, governing preferences, approach, and avoidance. In direct contrast to this view, our earliest research on reasoning was motivated by results from evolutionary game theory, which models conative (i.e., behavior-producing) mechanisms. Agents endowed with different behavior-producing mechanisms are allowed to interact, and the payoffs of these interactions determine how many copies of each (mechanism-bearing) agent appear in the next generation. This simulates how natural selection works, allowing one to see which mechanism types, which designs, will be retained over time and which will be eliminated from the population. One can then test to see whether mechanisms with …
影响因子：
5.4
作者：
BUSS, DM;SCHMITT, DP
通讯作者：
SCHMITT, DP