Identity, Incentives, and the Value of Information
Identity, Incentives, and the Value of Information
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身份、激励和信息的价值
DOI：
10.2308/accr-50156
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Alexis H. Kunz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Heinle;C. Hofmann;Alexis H. Kunz
我们研究了身份偏好对激励和绩效衡量之间相互关系的影响。在我们的模型中，如果管理者的行为与委托人发布的努力标准相冲突，那么管理者就会认同一个组织并失去效用。与文献中先前的论点相反，我们发现在某些条件下，与组织具有强烈认同感的管理者比不认同组织的管理者会获得更强的激励，并面临更多的绩效评估报告。我们的理论预测，经历过增强对公司认同感的事件的管理者会减少他们在短期价值创造方面的努力。我们还发现，在与对组织不太认同的经理签订合同时，公司更有可能采用不太精确但更一致的绩效衡量标准，例如股票价格。相比之下，在与对公司有强烈认同感的经理签订合同时，他们会使用更精确但不太一致的衡量标准，例如会计收益。
We examine the impact of identity preferences on the interrelation between incentives and performance measurement. In our model, a manager identifies with an organization and loses utility to the extent that his actions conflict with effort-standards issued by the principal. Contrary to prior arguments in the literature, we find conditions under which a manager who identifies strongly with the organization receives stronger incentives and faces more performance evaluation reports than a manager who does not identify with the organization. Our theory predicts that managers who experience events that boost their identification with the firm can decrease their effort in short-term value creation. We also find that firms are more likely to employ less precise but more congruent performance measures, such as stock prices, when contracting with managers who identify little with the organization. In contrast, they use more precise but less congruent measures, such as accounting earnings, when contracting with managers who identify strongly with the firm.
影响因子：
5.4
作者：
WHITE, RW
通讯作者：
WHITE, RW