Public Reporting and Demand Rationing: Evidence from the Nursing Home Industry.
Public Reporting and Demand Rationing: Evidence from the Nursing Home Industry.
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DOI：
10.1002/hec.3097
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发表时间：
2015-11
期刊：
影响因子：
2.1
通讯作者：
Konetzka RT
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
He D;Konetzka RT
这篇论文考察了公开报道的一个未被充分挖掘的意外后果：需求配给的可能性。尽管公开报道的目的是增加消费者获得高质量产品的机会，但它可能为面临固定产能和行政定价的高质量供应商提供了不正当的激励，以避免利润较低的居民类型。使用2002年实施公共报告系统前后疗养院行业的数据，我们发现，与没有能力限制的低质量疗养院相比，面临能力限制的高质量疗养院减少了利润较低的医疗补助住院患者的入院人数，而增加了利润更高的医疗保险和私人付费入院人数。这些影响虽然规模很小，但与供应商根据盈利能力对需求进行配给是一致的，并突显了机构细节在为受监管行业设计有效的公共报告制度方面的重要作用。
This paper examines an under-explored unintended consequence of public reporting: the potential for demand rationing. Public reporting, although intended to increase consumer access to high-quality products, may have provided the perverse incentive for high-quality providers facing fixed capacity and administrative pricing to avoid less profitable types of residents. Using data from the nursing home industry before and after the implementation of the public reporting system in 2002, we find that high-quality nursing homes facing capacity constraints reduced admissions of less profitable Medicaid residents while increasing the more profitable Medicare and private-pay admissions, relative to low-quality nursing homes facing no capacity constraints. These effects, although small in magnitude, are consistent with provider rationing of demand on the basis of profitability and underscore the important role of institutional details in designing effective public reporting systems for regulated industries.
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影响因子：
2.3
作者：
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通讯作者：
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影响因子：
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