Economic Shocks and Conflict: The (Absence of?) Evidence from Commodity Price- Working Paper 274
Economic Shocks and Conflict: The (Absence of?) Evidence from Commodity Price- Working Paper 274
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经济冲击和冲突：（缺乏？）来自商品价格的证据 - 工作文件 274
DOI：
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
C. Blattman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. Blattman
在对政治不稳定的研究中，最有影响力的观点之一是收入冲击会引发冲突。“国家奖励”理论认为，更高的收入会增加夺取国家的动机。“机会成本”理论认为，更高的价格会降低个人反抗的动机。这两种机制都是国家发展和崩溃的主要模型的核心。但它们是否有理有据呢？我们研究了外生商品价格冲击对冲突和政变的影响，发现支持这两种理论的证据都很少。证据尤其不利于国家作为奖品。我们确实发现了微弱的证据表明，随着价格的上涨，战斗的强度福尔斯会下降，这一结果更符合收入增加国家能力的观点，而不是追求奖励或机会成本。尽管如此，这些收入冲突机制的证据充其量也是微弱的。我们认为，错误和出版偏见可能扭曲了政治不稳定的理论和实证文献。
One of the most influential ideas in the study of political instability is that income shocks provoke conflict. “State prize” theories argue that higher revenues increase incentives to capture the state. “Opportunity cost” theories argue that higher prices decrease individual incen-tives to revolt. Both mechanisms are central to leading models of state development and collapse. But are they wellfounded? We examine the effects of exogenous commodity price shocks on conflict and coups, and find little evidence in favor of either theory. Evidence runs especially against the state as prize. We do find weak evidence that the intensity of fighting falls as prices rise—results more consistent with the idea that revenues augment state capacity, not prize-seeking or opportunity cost. Nevertheless, the evidence for any of these income-conflict mecha-nisms is weak at best. We argue that errors and publication bias have likely distorted the theoret-ical and empirical literature on political instability.
影响因子：
1.7
作者：
Chassang, Sylvain;Padro i Miquel, Gerard
通讯作者：
Padro i Miquel, Gerard