Can E-Procurement Reduce Bid Rigging in Public Auctions?

Can E-Procurement Reduce Bid Rigging in Public Auctions?
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电子采购能否减少公开拍卖中的串通投标行为?

DOI:
10.1093/joclec/nhab019
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发表时间:
2021
期刊:
Journal of Competition Law & Economics
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Ishii Rieko
Ishii Rieko
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Huber Martin;Imhof David;Ishii Rieko;Ishii Rieko

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采用电子采购可以通过限制投标人的面对面会议来减少公开拍卖中的串通投标行为。使用日本地方政府招标的建筑拍卖数据,其中纸质手动采购被电子采购取代,我们发现电子采购的采用降低了最初出价高于市场其他部分的部分市场的出价。当投标人可能位于同一行业社区时,拍卖中减少的程度较小,这表明当投标人有机会通过采购流程以外的方式进行沟通时,通过限制面对面会议的电子采购的效果较小。
The adoption of e-procurement may reduce bid rigging in public auctions by limiting in-person meetings of bidders. Using the data from construction auctions tendered by a Japanese local government where paper-based manual procurement is replaced by e-procurement, we find that the adoption of e-procurement reduced bids in a section of the market where the bids were initially higher than the other section of the market. The degree of reduction was smaller in an auction when the bidders were likely to be in the same industrial community, suggesting that the effect of e-procurement by limiting in-person meetings is smaller when the bidders have chances to communicate through other than the procurement processes.
DOI: 10.1007/s11151-009-9208-1
发表时间: 2009-06
影响因子: 1.1
作者:
H. Ohashi
通讯作者: H. Ohashi
DOI: 10.1007/s11151-006-0012-x
发表时间: 2006-03-01
影响因子: 1.1
作者:
Iimi, A
通讯作者: Iimi, A