Veto Players in Post-Conflict DDR Programs: Evidence From Nepal and the DRC
Veto Players in Post-Conflict DDR Programs: Evidence From Nepal and the DRC
复制标题
冲突后复员方案中的否决者:来自尼泊尔和刚果民主共和国的证据
DOI:
10.1080/17502977.2018.1501981
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发表时间:
2019
影响因子:
2
通讯作者:
Julia Strasheim
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Nadine Ansorg ; Julia Strasheim
Under what conditions are Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs successfully implemented following intrastate conflict? Previous research is dominated by under-theorized case studies that lack the ability to detect the precise factors and mechanisms that lead to successful DDR. In this article, we draw on game theory and ask how the number of veto players, their policy distance, and their internal cohesion impact DDR implementation. Using empirical evidence from Nepal and the Democratic Republic of Congo, we show that the number of veto players, rather than their distance and cohesion, explains the (lack of) implementation of DDR.
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影响因子:
1.2
作者:
A. Suhrke
通讯作者:
A. Suhrke
DOI:
10.1596/0-8213-3674-6
发表时间:
1996
期刊:
Stability: International Journal of Security and Development
影响因子:
--
作者:
Nat J. Colletta
通讯作者:
Nat J. Colletta
影响因子:
0.7
作者:
J. Karlsrud
通讯作者:
J. Karlsrud
影响因子:
0.7
作者:
Sebastian von Einsiedel;D. Malone;S. Pradhan
通讯作者:
S. Pradhan
影响因子:
--
作者:
D. Subedi;Prakash Bhattarai
通讯作者:
Prakash Bhattarai