Incentivized Resume Rating: Eliciting Employer Preferences Without Deception
Incentivized Resume Rating: Eliciting Employer Preferences Without Deception
复制标题
激励简历评级：在不欺骗的情况下获取雇主偏好
DOI：
10.1257/aer.20181714
复制
发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Corinne Low
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Judd B. Kessler;Corinne Low
我们引入了一种新的实验范式来评估雇主偏好，称为激励简历评级（IRR）。雇主评估他们知道是假设性的简历，以便与真实的求职者相匹配，在保留动机的同时避免审计研究中必要的欺骗。我们对从名校招聘大四学生的雇主采用IRR，随机选取假设候选人的人力资本特征和人口统计学特征。我们既衡量雇主对候选人的偏好，也衡量雇主对候选人接受工作机会的可能性的信念，避免了审计研究中典型的混淆。我们将讨论这种新方法的成本、收益和未来应用。（jd83, j26, j23, j24, m51）
We introduce a new experimental paradigm to evaluate employer preferences, called incentivized resume rating (IRR). Employers evaluate resumes they know to be hypothetical in order to be matched with real job seekers, preserving incentives while avoiding the deception necessary in audit studies. We deploy IRR with employers recruiting college seniors from a prestigious school, randomizing human capital characteristics and demographics of hypothetical candidates. We measure both employer preferences for candidates and employer beliefs about the likelihood that candidates will accept job offers, avoiding a typical confound in audit studies. We discuss the costs, benefits, and future applications of this new methodology. (JEL D83, I26, J23, J24, M51)
影响因子：
7.6
作者：
Greenwald, AG;McGhee, DE;Schwartz, JLK
通讯作者：
Schwartz, JLK