Stable cartels revisited
Stable cartels revisited
复制标题
重新审视稳定的卡特尔
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.289392
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发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
Effrosyni Diamantoudi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Effrosyni Diamantoudi
本文分析了企业有远见时卡特尔的稳定性。研究了D' Aspremont等人提出的价格领导模型.（1983），其中占主导地位的卡特尔通过确定市场价格而充当领导者，而边缘卡特尔则表现出竞争性。根据D' Aspremont et al.（1983）的方法，如果没有企业有动机进入或退出卡特尔，卡特尔是稳定的。在决定是否偏离时，公司将其现状与其单方面偏离所导致的结果进行比较。然而，公司没有检查诱导的结果是否真的会成为决定其利润的新现状。虽然企业预期价格调整后，其偏差，它忽略了更多的公司可能会退出（或进入）卡特尔的可能性。换句话说，企业没有考虑到这样一个事实，即由其偏离直接导致的结果本身可能不稳定。我们提出了一个卡特尔稳定的概念，使企业能够充分预见他们的偏差的结果。我们的解的概念是建立在冯·诺依曼和摩根斯坦（1944）的稳定集的精神，而它修改了优势关系后，海萨尼（1974）的批评。我们表明，总是存在一个独特的，非空的稳定卡特尔。
Summary.This paper analyzes cartel stability when firms are farsighted. It studies a price leadership model á la D’ Aspremont et al. (1983), where the dominant cartel acts as a leader by determining the market price, while the fringe behaves competitively. According to D’ Aspremont et al. ‘s (1983) approach a cartel is stable if no firm has an incentive to either enter or exit the cartel. In deciding whether to deviate or not, a firm compares its status quo with the outcome its unilateral deviation induces. However, the firm fails to examine whether the induced outcome will indeed become the new status quo that will determine its profits. Although the firm anticipates the price adjustment following its deviation, it ignores the possibility that more firms may exit (or enter) the cartel. In other words, the firm does not consider the fact that the outcome immediately induced by its deviation may not be stable itself. We propose a notion of cartel stability that allows firms to fully foresee the result of their deviation. Our solution concept is built in the spirit of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) stable set, while it modifies the dominance relation following Harsanyi’s (1974) criticism. We show that there always exists a unique, non-empty set of stable cartels.
影响因子：
1.6
作者：
M. Chwe
通讯作者：
M. Chwe
DOI：
10.2307/134972
发表时间：
1983-01-01
影响因子：
1.6
作者：
DASPREMONT, C;JACQUEMIN, A;WEYMARK, JA
通讯作者：
WEYMARK, JA