Strategic Joining and Optimal Pricing in the Cognitive Radio System With Delay-Sensitive Secondary Users
Strategic Joining and Optimal Pricing in the Cognitive Radio System With Delay-Sensitive Secondary Users
复制标题
时延敏感次用户认知无线电系统的策略加入与最优定价
DOI：
10.1109/tccn.2017.2723900
复制
发表时间：
2017-07
影响因子：
8.6
通讯作者：
Wei Wayne
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Wang Jinting;Zhang Yu;Wei Wayne
研究了认知无线电系统中主用户（PU）和次用户（SU）的传输时间服从随机分布的情况。为了刻画无线网络中随机接入协议的特性，采用重试系统对SU的分散和集中行为进行建模。基于服务回报和延迟成本之间的权衡，每个SU必须基于系统提供的不同级别的信息来决定是否在到达时加入或阻止系统。研究了SU没有信息或部分可观测信息的两种情况。在每种情况下，考虑两种策略：1）个人均衡策略（即，非合作策略），最大化SU自己的利润和2）社会最优策略（即，合作策略），最大化预期的社会福利。并对这两种策略进行了比较。结果表明，非合作情形下的均衡加入概率不小于合作情形下的最优加入概率。为了规范SU的行为，提出了一个均衡定价方案，使这些策略一致。此外，我们观察到，预期的延迟和系统中SU的平均数量只取决于SU的传输时间的前两个时刻。数值算例也表明，从社会规划者的角度来看，部分可观测队列更有利可图。
The transmission times with generally random distributed for both primary user (PU) and secondary user (SU) in a cognitive radio system with a single PU band is investigated. To characterize the random access protocols of wireless networks, a retrial queueing system is employed to model the decentralized and centralized behavior of SUs. Based on the tradeoff between the service reward and the delay cost, each SU must decide whether to join or balk the system upon arrival based on different levels of information provided by the system. Two situations in which SUs have no information or partially observable information are studied. In each situation, two kinds of strategies are considered: 1) individual equilibrium strategies (i.e., non-cooperative strategies) that maximize SUs’ own profit and 2) socially optimal strategies (i.e., cooperative strategies) that maximize the expected social welfare. Moreover, comparisons are carried out between these two kinds of strategies. The results indicate that the equilibrium joining probability in the non-cooperative case is not less than the optimal joining probability in the cooperative case. To regulate the SUs’ behavior, an equilibrium pricing scheme is proposed to make these strategies coincide. In addition, we observe that the expected delay and the mean number of SUs in the system only depend on the first two moments of the SU’s transmission time. Numerical examples also show that the partially observable queue is more profitable from the perspective of the social planner.
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DOI：
10.1109/ijcnn.2008.4634283
发表时间：
2008-04
期刊：
IEEE INFOCOM 2008 - The 27th Conference on Computer Communications
影响因子：
--
作者：
Senhua Huang;Xin Liu;Z. Ding
通讯作者：
Senhua Huang;Xin Liu;Z. Ding
影响因子：
1.2
作者：
V. Kulkarni;B. Choi
通讯作者：
V. Kulkarni;B. Choi
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影响因子：
7.9
作者：
Wen;Jung;Yu
通讯作者：
Yu
影响因子：
16.4
作者：
K. Jagannathan;Ishai Menache;G. Zussman;E. Modiano
通讯作者：
K. Jagannathan;Ishai Menache;G. Zussman;E. Modiano
影响因子：
1.2
作者：
Amar Aissani
通讯作者：
Amar Aissani