The Politics of Committee Chairs Assignment in Ireland and Spain
The Politics of Committee Chairs Assignment in Ireland and Spain
复制标题
爱尔兰和西班牙委员会主席任命的政治
DOI：
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复制
发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Francisco Cantú
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jorge M. Fernandes;P. Riera;Francisco Cantú
委员会主席是立法机构的关键职位。它们的持有者被赋予重要的正式和非正式权力。在这篇文章中，我们对爱尔兰和西班牙的委员会主席分配的政治进行了比较评估。使用涵盖两国过去二十年的原始数据集，我们做出了双重贡献。基于考克斯和McCubbins的美国国会的党派理论，我们首先制定了一个框架，议会民主表明，党的领导分配低选举脆弱性的立法委员会主席购买他们的忠诚党。此外，结果表明，这些立法者被分配到委员会主席，以提高他们的意愿，为党派的公共产品工作。其次，我们的贡献利用选举制度的变化，以显示不同的制度环境如何产生类似的结果。
Committee chairs are key positions in legislatures. Their holders are vested with important formal and informal powers. In this article, we make a comparative appraisal of the politics of committee chair assignment in Ireland and Spain. Using an original dataset that covers the past two decades in both countries, we make a twofold contribution. Based on Cox and McCubbins’s partisan theory of US Congress, we first develop a framework for parliamentary democracies by showing that party leadership assigns legislators with low electoral vulnerability to committee chairs to buy their loyalty to the party. Furthermore, results suggest that those legislators are assigned to committee chairs to heighten their willingness to work for partisan public goods. Secondly, our contribution leverages electoral systems variation to show how different institutional environments produce similar outcomes.
DOI：
10.1080/13572334.2017.1358980
发表时间：
2017
期刊：
The Journal of Legislative Studies
影响因子：
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作者：
Sieberer;Höhmann
通讯作者：
Höhmann