Sovereign Defaults and Expropriations: Empirical Regularities
Sovereign Defaults and Expropriations: Empirical Regularities
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主权违约和征收：经验规律
DOI：
10.1596/1813-9450-6218
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Rong Qian
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Maya Eden;Aart Kraay;Rong Qian
本文使用了一个大型跨国数据集，实证研究与主权违约的外部私人债权人和没收的外国直接投资在发展中国家自20世纪70年代以来的因素。从长远来看，主权违约和没收很可能发生在同一个国家。然而，在短期内，这些事件是不相关的。债务危机更有可能发生在债务快速积累时期之后，在这一时期，经济增长率较低，而且发生在政策执行不力的国家，而且随着时间的推移，违约的持续性不强。相反，征用与外国直接投资水平、增长或政策绩效并没有系统的联系。然而，在右翼政府的统治下，征用的可能性较小，而且随着时间的推移，征用会持续很长时间。也几乎没有证据表明，最近的违约历史与征用有关，反之亦然。本文讨论了这些研究结果的模型，强调报复手段维持主权借款和外国投资的平衡，以及对这两种类型的事件的政治风险保险的影响。
This paper uses a large cross-country dataset to empirically examine factors associated with sovereign defaults on external private creditors and expropriation of foreign direct investments in developing countries since the 1970s. In the long run, sovereign defaults and expropriations are likely to occur in the same countries. In the short run, however, these events are uncorrelated. Defaults are more likely to occur following periods of rapid debt accumulation, when growth is low, and in countries with weak policy performance, and defaults are not strongly persistent over time. In contrast, expropriations are not systematically related to the level of foreign direct investment, to growth, or to policy performance. Expropriations are however less likely under right-wing governments, and are strongly persistent over time. There is also little evidence that a history of recent defaults is associated with expropriations, and vice versa. The paper discusses the implications of these findings for models that emphasize retaliation as means for sustaining sovereign borrowing and foreign investment in equilibrium, as well as the implications for political risk insurance against the two types of events.
影响因子：
2.5
作者：
Beck, T;Clarke, G;Walsh, P
通讯作者：
Walsh, P