Collateralized Debt as the Optimal Contract
Collateralized Debt as the Optimal Contract
复制标题
债务抵押作为最优合约
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2123492
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发表时间：
1991
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Jeffrey M. Lacker
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jeffrey M. Lacker
在具有事后私人信息的简单风险分担环境中，发现债务抵押合同是最优配置的条件。最优性的关键条件是借款人比贷款人更看重抵押品；否则，最优契约就不像债务了。有限的抵押品会产生内生的借贷约束，进一步在借方和贷方的跨期边际替代率之间制造楔子。我认为，也许所有的债务合约都隐含有抵押。
In a simple risk-sharing environment with ex post private information, conditions are found under which a collateralized debt contract is the optimal allocation. The critical condition for optimality is that the borrower values the collateral good more highly than does the lender; otherwise the optimal contract does not resemble debt. Limited collateral can give rise to an endogenous borrowing constraint, driving a further wedge between the intertemporal marginal rates of substitution of the borrower and the lender. I argue that perhaps all debt contracts are implicitly collateralized.
影响因子：
4
作者：
Douglas Gale;M. Hellwig
通讯作者：
Douglas Gale;M. Hellwig