Stable Sets in Matching Problems with Coalitional Sovereignty and Path Dominance
Stable Sets in Matching Problems with Coalitional Sovereignty and Path Dominance
复制标题
联合主权和路径优势匹配问题的稳定集
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2791994
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Vincent Vannetelbosch
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Herings;A. Mauleon;Vincent Vannetelbosch
我们在联盟主权假设下研究一对一匹配问题的冯·诺伊曼·摩根斯特恩稳定集，这意味着偏离联盟的参与者没有权力安排联盟外代理的比赛。我们研究了成对偏差和联合偏差的情况。我们进一步认为，主导地位必须被范迪门（van Deemen，1991）以及佩奇和伍德斯（Page and Wooders，2009）的路径主导地位所取代。这分别产生成对近视 vNM 集和近视 vNM 集。我们获得了对两种类型的稳定集的唯一预测：属于核心的匹配集。我们还表明，1 级远见集的成对和联合类似物产生了作为唯一预测的核心。
We study von Neumann Morgenstern stable sets for one-to-one matching problems under the assumption of coalitional sovereignty, meaning that a deviating coalition of players does not have the power to arrange the matches of agents outside the coalition. We study both the case of pairwise and coalitional deviations. We argue further that dominance has to be replaced by path dominance along the lines of van Deemen (1991) and Page and Wooders (2009). This results in the pairwise myopic vNM set and the myopic vNM set, respectively. We obtain a unique prediction for both types of stable sets: the set of matchings that belong to the core. We also show that the pairwise and coalitional analogues of the level-1 farsighted set yield the core as the unique prediction.
影响因子：
1.6
作者：
M. Chwe
通讯作者：
M. Chwe