Reciprocity and resistance to change: An experimental study
Reciprocity and resistance to change: An experimental study
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互惠与变革阻力：一项实验研究
DOI：
10.1016/j.jebo.2017.12.017
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Stefan Traub
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jan Philipp Krügel;Stefan Traub
许多不确定的组织变革由于员工的抵制而失败。本文研究的是变更承诺发生的情形。我们建议，对雇主的互惠有助于增加变更批准。在我们的实验中，受试者玩了一个礼物交换和阈值贡献游戏的组合。在每一组中，一名雇主选择工资，然后五名雇员决定他们的努力。如果员工至少付出了最低限度的努力，就可以进行“改革”。这项改革提高了效率，但也增加了雇员之间的不平等。我们发现，收益的不确定性并不一定会导致抵抗。如果雇主能够通过提供公平的工资来引发员工的互惠行为，那么改革获得批准的可能性特别高，这证实了我们的假设。
Many uncertain organizational changes fail because of resistance by employees. This paper studies the circumstances under which acceptance to change occurs. We propose that reciprocity towards the employer helps to increase change approval. Subjects in our experiment play a combination of a gift exchange and a threshold contribution game. In each group, one employer chooses a wage and then five employees decide on their effort. A ‘reform’ is adopted if the employees exert at least a minimum threshold of effort. The reform is efficiency enhancing but also raises inequality among employees. We find that uncertainty over payoffs does not necessarily lead to resistance. The likelihood of reform approval is especially high if the employer is able to trigger reciprocal behavior in employees by offering a fair wage, which confirms our hypothesis.
影响因子：
9.9
作者：
Oreg, S
通讯作者：
Oreg, S