On GPS spoofing of aerial platforms: a review of threats, challenges, methodologies, and future research directions.
On GPS spoofing of aerial platforms: a review of threats, challenges, methodologies, and future research directions.
复制标题
空中平台 GPS 欺骗：威胁、挑战、方法和未来研究方向回顾。
DOI：
10.7717/peerj-cs.507
复制
发表时间：
2021
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Iqbal W
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Khan SZ;Mohsin M;Iqbal W
无人机系统（UAV，Drones）最初仅以其军事应用而闻名，在民用领域也越来越受欢迎。在军事领域，无人机已经证明自己是一个强大的力量倍增器，通过无人驾驶，全天候，远程和高耐力的任务，用于监视，侦察，搜索和救援，甚至武装战斗应用。随着物联网（IoT）的出现，无人机的商业部署也呈指数级增长，从货运和出租车服务到农业、救灾、风险评估和关键基础设施监控。无论部署部门如何，无人机通常被委托执行安全，时间和责任关键任务，因此需要安全，强大和值得信赖的操作。相比之下，无人机需求的上升，加上市场要求减小尺寸、重量、功率和成本（SwaP-C）参数的压力，导致厂商往往忽视安全方面，从而诱发严重的安全和安保威胁。由于无人机依靠全球定位系统（GPS）进行定位和导航，因此它们可能成为GPS干扰和欺骗攻击的牺牲品。GPS易受欺骗的弱点对无人机有着严重的影响，因为使用民用GPS的受害者无人机可能会被误导，甚至完全被恶意劫持，正如使用商用GPS欺骗硬件的几项学术研究所证明的那样。除了无人机，GPS欺骗攻击同样适用于其他依赖GPS的平台，包括有人驾驶飞机、地面车辆和蜂窝系统。本文对GPS欺骗威胁进行了全面的综述，特别关注其在无人机和其他依赖GPS的移动的平台上的适用性。它提出了一种新的分类GPS欺骗攻击和批判性地分析了不同的欺骗技术的基础上放置的欺骗设备，攻击的隐蔽性，攻击方法和攻击者的目标。我们还讨论了一些最近的实验，从公开文献中利用商业可用的硬件成功地进行欺骗攻击。
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAVs, Drones), initially known only for their military applications, are getting increasingly popular in the civil sector as well. Over the military canvas, drones have already proven themselves as a potent force multiplier through unmanned, round-the-clock, long-range and high-endurance missions for surveillance, reconnaissance, search and rescue, and even armed combat applications. With the emergence of the Internet of Things (IoT), commercial deployments of drones are also growing exponentially, ranging from cargo and taxi services to agriculture, disaster relief, risk assessment and monitoring of critical infrastructures. Irrespective of the deployment sector, drones are often entrusted to conduct safety, time and liability critical tasks, thus requiring secure, robust and trustworthy operations. In contrast, the rise in UAVs’ demand, coupled with market pressure to reduce size, weight, power and cost (SwaP-C) parameters, has caused vendors to often ignore security aspects, thus inducing serious safety and security threats. As UAVs rely on Global Positioning System (GPS) for positioning and navigation, they can fall prey to GPS jamming and spoofing attacks. The vulnerability of GPS to spoofing has serious implications for UAVs, as victim drones using civil GPS can be misdirected or even completely hijacked for malicious intents, as already demonstrated in several academic research efforts using commercially available GPS spoofing hardware. Beside UAVs, GPS spoofing attacks are equally applicable to other GPS-dependent platforms, including manned aircraft, ground vehicles, and cellular systems. This paper conducts a comprehensive review of GPS spoofing threats, with a special focus on their applicability over UAVs and other GPS-dependent mobile platforms. It presents a novel taxonomy of GPS spoofing attacks and critically analyzes different spoofing techniques based upon placement of spoofing device, attack stealthiness, attack methodologies, and objectives of the attacker. We also discuss some of the recent experiments from open literature which utilized commercially available hardware for successfully conducting spoofing attacks.
登录
查看更多内容
影响因子：
11.2
作者：
Guevenc, Ismail;Koohifar, Farshad;Matolak, David
通讯作者：
Matolak, David
影响因子：
2.2
作者：
Bhatti, Jahshan;Humphreys, Todd E.
通讯作者：
Humphreys, Todd E.
影响因子：
6.6
作者：
Gao, Yang;Li, Hong;Feng, Zhenming
通讯作者：
Feng, Zhenming
影响因子：
9.3
作者：
He, Daojing;Liu, Hong;Guizani, Mohsen
通讯作者：
Guizani, Mohsen
影响因子：
2.2
作者：
Guenther, Christoph
通讯作者：
Guenther, Christoph