Who Runs? Honesty and Self-Selection into Politics
Who Runs? Honesty and Self-Selection into Politics
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谁跑？
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2849743
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Maik T. Schneider
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Sebastian Fehrler;U. Fischbacher;Maik T. Schneider
我们研究了自我选择进入政界的动机，以及它们如何依赖于进入过程的透明度。为此，我们建立了一个两阶段的政治竞争模型，并在实验室对其关键机制进行了测试。在进入竞选阶段，潜在的候选人为了成为本党的提名人而展开竞争。在选举阶段，被提名的候选人通过向选民作出不具约束力的承诺来进行竞选。我们在实验中证实了模型的关键预测，发现不诚实的人自我选择参加政治竞选的比例过高；如果进入阶段对选民透明，这种逆向选择效应是可以避免的。
We examine the incentives to self-select into politics and how they depend on the transparency of the entry process. To this end, we set up a two-stage political competition model and test its key mechanisms in the lab. At the entry stage, potential candidates compete in a contest to become their party's nominee. At the election stage, the nominated candidates campaign by making non-binding promises to voters. Confirming the model's key predictions, we find in the experiment that dishonest people over-proportionally self-select into the political race; and that this adverse selection effect can be prevented if the entry stage is made transparent to voters.
影响因子：
3.6
作者：
Fischbacher, Urs;Foellmi-Heusi, Franziska
通讯作者：
Foellmi-Heusi, Franziska