Excise tax avoidance: the case of state cigarette taxes.

Excise tax avoidance: the case of state cigarette taxes.
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DOI:
10.1016/j.jhealeco.2013.08.005
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发表时间:
2013-12
影响因子:
3.5
通讯作者:
Liu, Feng
Liu, Feng
中科院分区:
经济学2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
DeCicca, Philip;Kenkel, Donald;Liu, Feng

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本文对卷烟避税问题进行了应用福利经济学分析。我们开发了一个扩展的标准公式的最优庇古纠正税,将消费者避免税收的可能性,使附近的低税司法管辖区购买。为了给我们的公式提供一个关键参数,我们估计了一个结构性的内生转换回归模型的过境和卷烟价格。在说明性的计算中,我们发现,对于许多国家,在考虑避税后,最优税收至少比简单地将外部成本内部化的标准庇古税小20%。我们的经验估计,避税强烈响应的价格差异是这一结果的主要原因。我们还使用我们的研究结果,以审查取代可避免的国家消费税的好处,难以避免的联邦消费税的香烟。
We conduct an applied welfare economics analysis of cigarette tax avoidance. We develop an extension of the standard formula for the optimal Pigouvian corrective tax to incorporate the possibility that consumers avoid the tax by making purchases in nearby lower-tax jurisdictions. To provide a key parameter for our formula, we estimate a structural endogenous switching regression model of border-crossing and cigarette prices. In illustrative calculations, we find that for many states, after taking into account tax avoidance the optimal tax is at least 20 percent smaller than the standard Pigouvian tax that simply internalizes external costs. Our empirical estimate that tax avoidance strongly responds to the price differential is the main reason for this result. We also use our results to examine the benefits of replacing avoidable state excise taxes with a harder-to-avoid federal excise tax on cigarettes.
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