The variety of evidence thesis and its independence of degrees of independence

The variety of evidence thesis and its independence of degrees of independence
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证据论的多样性及其独立性程度

DOI:
10.1007/s11229-020-02738-5
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发表时间:
2021
期刊:
影响因子:
1.5
通讯作者:
J. Landes
J. Landes
中科院分区:
人文科学2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
J. Landes

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直觉的证据多样性命题指出,在其他条件不变的情况下,对于一个假设,更多的证据比更少的证据更有力地证实了它。最近的贝叶斯分析对其有效性提出了严重质疑。Claveau提出了一个新的反例:源独立性的逐渐增加会导致假设证实的减少。我表明,Claveau的措施,逐步源独立遭受两种类型的不一致的怀疑。因此,我提出了一个更自然的措施,逐步源独立性,这是不受不一致。克莱沃的反例,以各种证据的论点消失的措施,我建议。因此,我认为我的措施是可取的,这篇论文至少似乎不困扰Claveau的论点。
The intuitive Variety of Evidence Thesis states that, ceteris paribus, more varied evidence for a hypothesis confirms it more strongly than less varied evidence. Recent Bayesian analyses have raised serious doubts in its validity. Claveau suggests the existence of a novel type of counter-example to this thesis: a gradual increase in source independence can lead to a decrease in hypothesis confirmation. I show that Claveau’s measure of gradual source independence suffers from two unsuspected types of inconsistencies. I hence put forward a more natural measure of gradual source independence which is not plagued by inconsistencies. Claveau’s counter-examples to the variety of evidence thesis disappear with the measure I suggest. I hence argue that my measure is preferable and that this thesis does at least not seem to be troubled by Claveau’s arguments.
DOI: 10.1017/9781107286184
发表时间: 2018-01-01
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