SHOULD SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES BE SHARP?
SHOULD SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES BE SHARP?
复制标题
主观概率应该是尖锐的吗?
DOI:
10.1017/epi.2014.8
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发表时间:
2014
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Bradley S
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Bradley S
There has been much recent interest in imprecise probabilities, models of belief that allow unsharp or fuzzy credence. There have also been some influential criticisms of this position. Here we argue, chiefly against Elga (2010), that subjective probabilities need not be sharp. The key question is whether the imprecise probabilist can make reasonable sequences of decisions. We argue that she can. We outline Elga's argument and clarify the assumptions he makes and the principles of rationality he is implicitly committed to. We argue that these assumptions are too strong and that rational imprecise choice is possible in the absence of these overly strong conditions.
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影响因子:
0.5
作者:
B. V. Fraassen
通讯作者:
B. V. Fraassen
影响因子:
0.9
作者:
Jacob Chandler
通讯作者:
Jacob Chandler
DOI:
10.2307/2941089
发表时间:
1995
期刊:
The Journal of Philosophy
影响因子:
--
作者:
Wlodek Rabinowicz
通讯作者:
Wlodek Rabinowicz
DOI:
10.1016/s0049-237x(06)80056-x
发表时间:
1995
期刊:
Studies in logic and the foundations of mathematics
影响因子:
--
作者:
Teddy Seidenfeld
通讯作者:
Teddy Seidenfeld
DOI:
10.2307/2026054
发表时间:
1986
期刊:
The Journal of Philosophy
影响因子:
--
作者:
F. Schick
通讯作者:
F. Schick