SHOULD SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES BE SHARP?

SHOULD SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES BE SHARP?
复制标题

主观概率应该是尖锐的吗?

DOI:
10.1017/epi.2014.8
复制
发表时间:
2014
期刊:
Episteme
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Bradley S
Bradley S
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Bradley S

文献摘要

参考文献

被引文献

相似文献

最近,人们对不精确的概率产生了很大的兴趣,这是一种允许模糊或模糊信任的信念模型。对这一立场也有一些有影响力的批评。在这里,我们主要是反对埃尔加(2010),我们认为主观概率不一定是尖锐的。关键问题是,不精确的概率论者能否做出合理的决策序列。我们认为她可以。我们概述了埃尔加的论点,并澄清了他所做的假设和他隐含承诺的理性原则。我们认为,这些假设过于强烈,在没有这些过于强烈的条件的情况下,理性的、不精确的选择是可能的。
There has been much recent interest in imprecise probabilities, models of belief that allow unsharp or fuzzy credence. There have also been some influential criticisms of this position. Here we argue, chiefly against Elga (2010), that subjective probabilities need not be sharp. The key question is whether the imprecise probabilist can make reasonable sequences of decisions. We argue that she can. We outline Elga's argument and clarify the assumptions he makes and the principles of rationality he is implicitly committed to. We argue that these assumptions are too strong and that rational imprecise choice is possible in the absence of these overly strong conditions.
概率图景中的数字
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-0681-5_21
发表时间: 1990
期刊: Theoria
影响因子: 0.5
作者:
B. V. Fraassen
通讯作者: B. V. Fraassen
DOI: 10.1007/s10670-013-9597-2
发表时间: 2014
期刊: Erkenntnis
影响因子: 0.9
作者:
Jacob Chandler
通讯作者: Jacob Chandler
DOI: 10.2307/2941089
发表时间: 1995
期刊: The Journal of Philosophy
影响因子: --
作者:
Wlodek Rabinowicz
通讯作者: Wlodek Rabinowicz
当正常形式和扩展形式决策不同时
DOI: 10.1016/s0049-237x(06)80056-x
发表时间: 1995
期刊: Studies in logic and the foundations of mathematics
影响因子: --
作者:
Teddy Seidenfeld
通讯作者: Teddy Seidenfeld
荷兰博彩公司和资金泵
DOI: 10.2307/2026054
发表时间: 1986
期刊: The Journal of Philosophy
影响因子: --
作者:
F. Schick
通讯作者: F. Schick