Individual differences in framing and conjunction effects
Individual differences in framing and conjunction effects
复制标题
框架和联合效应的个体差异
DOI：
10.1080/135467898394094
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发表时间：
1998
影响因子：
2.6
通讯作者：
R. F. West
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
K. Stanovich;R. F. West
根据Slovic和Tversky（1974）的理解/接受原则，研究了各种框架和连接问题上的个体差异，即更多的反思和熟练的推理者更有可能肯定定义规范推理的公理，并认可知情专家的任务解释。从这一原理推导出的预测在疾病问题中被广泛讨论的框架效应和琳达问题中的连接谬误中得到了证实。认知能力较高的受试者更有可能避免每个谬论。其他框架问题产生的经验支持水平要低得多。据推测，两过程推理理论（如Evans， 1984,1996; Sloman, 1996）结合两种过程不同地反映互动智力和分析智力的假设，可以最好地解释个体差异的不同模式。
Individual differences on a variety of framing and conjunction problems were examined in light of Slovic and Tversky’s (1974) understanding/acceptance principle—that more reflective and skilled reasoners are more likely to affirm the axioms that define normative reasoning and to endorse the task construals of informed experts. The predictions derived from the principle were confirmed for the much discussed framing effect in the Disease Problem and for the conjunction fallacy on the Linda Problem. Subjects of higher cognitive ability were disproportionately likely to avoid each fallacy. Other framing problems produced much more modest levels of empirical support. It is conjectured that the varying patterns of individual differences are best explained by two-process theories of reasoning (e.g. Evans, 1984, 1996; Sloman, 1996) conjoined with the assumption that the two processes differentially reflect interactional and analytic intelligence.
影响因子：
5.4
作者：
Kahneman, D;Tversky, A
通讯作者：
Tversky, A
认知和心理动力学无意识的整合。
DOI：
10.1037//0003-066x.49.8.709
发表时间：
1994
期刊：
The American psychologist
影响因子：
--
作者：
Epstein,S
通讯作者：
Epstein,S