Relinquishing Riches: Auctions vs Informal Negotiations in Texas Oil and Gas Leasing
Relinquishing Riches: Auctions vs Informal Negotiations in Texas Oil and Gas Leasing
复制标题
放弃财富:德克萨斯州石油和天然气租赁中的拍卖与非正式谈判
DOI:
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发表时间:
2019
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
R. Sweeney
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
Thomas R. Covert;R. Sweeney
This paper compares outcomes from informally negotiated oil and gas leases to those awarded via centralized auction. We focus on Texas, where legislative decisions in the early twentieth century assigned thousands of proximate parcels to different mineral allocation mechanisms. We show that during the fracking boom, which began unexpectedly decades later, auctioned leases generated at least 55 percent larger up-front payments and 40 percent more output than negotiated leases did. These results suggest large potential gains from employing centralized, formal mechanisms in markets that traditionally allocate in an unstructured fashion, including the broader $3 trillion market for privately owned minerals. (JEL D44, L71, Q35)
DOI:
10.1093/restud/rdaa007
发表时间:
2020
期刊:
The Review of Economic Studies
影响因子:
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作者:
Larsen, Bradley J
通讯作者:
Larsen, Bradley J