Coalitional and Strategic Market Games
Coalitional and Strategic Market Games
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联盟和战略市场博弈
DOI：
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Sonja Brangewitz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Sonja Brangewitz
本文主要分为两个部分：第一部分是关于联盟市场博弈的研究，第二部分是关于战略市场博弈的研究。在联盟市场博弈中，研究了合作博弈与市场之间的关系，以及它们各自的解的概念。在与Jan-Philip Gamp的联合工作中，我们证明了以下结果：对于具有可转移效用的联盟市场博弈，我们给出了一个详细的证明，将Shapley和Shubik（1975）的结果扩展到核心的任何闭凸子集。
对于具有不可转移效用的联盟市场博弈，我们将Qin（1993）的结果推广到一类大的内核闭子集。之后，我们研究了内部核心和非对称纳什讨价还价解决方案之间的关系。
战略市场博弈是一种非合作博弈，用于描述交换经济中的价格形成。本文的出发点是Giraud和Weyers（2004）的模型。对于有限视野的战略市场博弈，我证明了一个类似的完美的民间定理，即使有抵押品的要求，几乎一切都是可能的，只要人们有足够的耐心。最后，在与盖尔Giraud的联合工作中，对于无限水平和不完全信息的战略市场博弈，我们证明了一个部分民间定理。
This thesis consists of two main parts: The first one is on coalitional market games whereas the second one is on strategic market games. In coalitional market games the relationship between cooperative games and markets, and their respective solution concepts are investigated. In joint work with Jan-Philip Gamp we show the following results: For coalitional market games with transferable utility we present a detailed proof that extends the results of Shapley and Shubik (1975) to any closed convex subset of the core following a remark of these authors.
For coalitional market games with non-transferable utility we extend the results of Qin (1993) to a large class of closed subsets of the inner core. Afterwards, we investigate the relationship between the inner core and asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions.
A strategic market game is a non-cooperative game that is used to describe the price formation in an exchange economy. In this thesis the departing point is the model in Giraud and Weyers (2004). For strategic market games with finite horizon, I show proving an analogue of a perfect folk theorem that even with collateral requirements almost everything is possible as soon as people are sufficiently patient. Finally, in joint work with Gael Giraud, for strategic market games with infinite horizon and incomplete information we prove a partial folk theorem a la Wiseman (2011).
竞争结果与南大市场博弈的内核
影响因子：
1.3
作者：
Brangewitz
通讯作者：
Brangewitz