Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games
Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games
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竞争结果与南大市场博弈的内核
DOI:
10.1007/s00199-014-0846-7
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发表时间:
2014
期刊:
影响因子:
1.3
通讯作者:
Brangewitz
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Brangewitz
We consider the inner core as a solution concept for cooperative games with non-transferable utility (NTU) and its relationship to payoffs of competitive equilibria ofmarketsthat are induced by NTU games. An NTU game is an NTU market game if there exists a market such that the set of utility allocations a coalition can achieve in the market coincides with the set of utility allocations the coalition can achieve in the game. In this paper, we introduce a new construction of a market based on a closed subset of the inner core which satisfies astrict positive separability. We show that the constructed market represents the NTU game and, further, has the given closed set as the set of payoff vectors of competitive equilibria. It turns out that this market is not uniquely determined, and thus, we obtain a class of markets. Our results generalize those relating to competitive outcomes of NTU market games in the literature.
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DOI:
--
发表时间:
1974
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
L. Billera;R. Bixby
通讯作者:
R. Bixby
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2012
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
J. Gamp
通讯作者:
J. Gamp
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2012
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
Sonja Brangewitz
通讯作者:
Sonja Brangewitz
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2000
期刊:
Games Econ. Behav.
影响因子:
--
作者:
Rodney J. Garratt;C. Qin
通讯作者:
C. Qin
影响因子:
0.6
作者:
L. Billera;R. Bixby
通讯作者:
L. Billera;R. Bixby