On the Efficiency of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism for Divisible Resources
On the Efficiency of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism for Divisible Resources
复制标题
论可分割资源比例分配机制的效率
DOI:
10.1007/s00224-016-9701-5
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发表时间:
2016
影响因子:
0.5
通讯作者:
Christodoulou G
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
Christodoulou G
We study the efficiency of theproportional allocation mechanismthat is widely used to allocate divisible resources. Each agent submits a bid for each divisible resource and receives a fraction proportional to her bids. We quantify the inefficiency of Nash equilibria by studying the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of the induced game under complete and incomplete information. When agents’ valuations are concave, we show that the Bayesian Nash equilibria can be arbitrarily inefficient, in contrast to the well-known 4/3 bound for pure equilibria Johari and Tsitsiklis (Math. Oper. Res.29(3), 407–435 2004). Next, we upper bound the PoA over Bayesian equilibria by 2 when agents’ valuations are subadditive, generalizing and strengthening previous bounds on lattice submodular valuations. Furthermore, we show that this bound is tight and cannot be improved by anysimpleorscale-freemechanism. Then we switch to settings with budget constraints, and we show an improved upper bound on the PoA over coarse-correlated equilibria. Finally, we prove that the PoA is exactly 2 for pure equilibria in the polyhedral environment.
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DOI:
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发表时间:
2007
期刊:
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
影响因子:
--
作者:
T. Nguyen;É. Tardos
通讯作者:
É. Tardos
DOI:
10.1145/2847520
发表时间:
2013-12
期刊:
ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.
影响因子:
--
作者:
G. Christodoulou;Annamária Kovács;A. Sgouritsa;Bo Tang
通讯作者:
G. Christodoulou;Annamária Kovács;A. Sgouritsa;Bo Tang
影响因子:
8.2
作者:
N. Nisan
通讯作者:
N. Nisan
DOI:
--
发表时间:
1950
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
R. Rosenbaum
通讯作者:
R. Rosenbaum
DOI:
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发表时间:
2013
期刊:
Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
影响因子:
--
作者:
J. Correa;Andreas S. Schulz;N. Stier
通讯作者:
N. Stier