UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository) Self-image and willful ignorance in social decisions
UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository) Self-image and willful ignorance in social decisions
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UvA-DARE（数字学术知识库）社会决策中的自我形象和故意无知
DOI：
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. V. D. Weele
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Zachary Grossman;J. V. D. Weele
回避有关利己主义决定或故意无知的不利福利后果的信息，是社会有害行为的重要来源。为了理解这个问题，我们分析了一个贝叶斯信号传递模型，该模型是一个关心自我形象并有机会学习个人代价高昂的行动的社会好处的代理。我们表明，故意的无知可以作为选择fi的行为的借口，通过混淆有关决策者偏好的信号，并有助于维持这样的想法，即代理人在完全信息下会有良好的行为。我们得出了几个与基于结果的偏好或社会形象关注不一致的行为预测，并进行了实验来测试它们。我们的fi编码，以及之前的一些实验结果，都支持这些预测，从而支持更广泛的自我信号理论。
Avoiding information about adverse welfare consequences of self-interested decisions, or willful ignorance , is an important source of socially harmful behavior. To understand this issue, we analyze a Bayesian signaling model of an agent who cares about self-image and has the opportunity to learn the social benefits of a personally costly action. We show that willful ignorance can serve as an excuse for selfish behavior by obfuscating the signal about the decision-maker’s preferences, and help maintain the idea that the agent would have acted virtuously under full information. We derive several behavioral predictions that are inconsistent with either outcome-based preferences or social-image concern and conduct experiments to test them. Our findings, as well as a number of previous experimental results, offer support for these predictions and thus, the broader theory of self-signaling.
影响因子：
3.6
作者：
Fischbacher, Urs;Foellmi-Heusi, Franziska
通讯作者：
Foellmi-Heusi, Franziska