A higher-order solution to the problem of the concept horse
A higher-order solution to the problem of the concept horse
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概念马问题的高阶解
DOI：
10.3998/ergo.12405314.0003.006
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Nicholas K. Jones
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Nicholas K. Jones
本文使用高阶逻辑的资源来阐明弗雷格的谓词指称概念，以及更一般的词与世界关系的概念，这不受概念马问题的影响。然后解决了广泛的此类观点的突出风格的可表达性问题，其版本由林尼博、黑尔和赖特提出。描述语言与现实之间关系的核心是描述谓词与现实之间的关系。弗雷格的“马”概念问题（§1）威胁到一种突出的解释风格，在这种解释风格中，谓词所指的语言外实体与单数术语所指的实体在性质上根本不同。在这里，我探讨了分析传统历史上的这个经典问题与关于高阶逻辑解释的当代观点之间的相互作用，发展了不受该问题影响的高阶弗雷格语义学和形而上学。我的方法的核心是一个看似反弗雷格语义框架，它似乎保留了谓词的引用。我认为（§ 2）这种外观具有误导性：从更高阶的角度来看，这种看似反弗雷格的语义可以被视为引用性地对待谓词。在阐明了该论证所依赖的高阶逻辑概念（§3）之后，我展示了如何将这种方法与弗雷格语义学和形而上学的其他核心原理结合起来，而不会引起概念马问题（§4）。然后，我（第 5 节）阐述了对此类观点的一种突出的反对风格，其版本由 Oystein Linnebo、Bob Hale 和 Crispin Wright 提出。教训是，弗雷格的谓词指称概念——以及更一般的语言与现实关系——的概念马问题，以及它们与谓词的非指称处理的明显冲突，都源于未能认真对待高阶量化的存在意义，同时无理地坚持用一阶术语来表述弗雷格语义。
This paper uses the resources of higher-order logic to articulate a Fregean conception of predicate reference, and of word-world relations more generally, that is immune to the concept horse problem. A prominent style of expressibility problem for views of broadly this kind, versions of which are due to Linnebo, Hale, and Wright, is then addressed. Central to an account of the relationship between language and reality is an account of that between predicates and reality. Frege’s problem of the concept horse (§1) threatens one prominent style of account, on which predicates refer to extra-linguistic entities fundamentally different in kind from those to which singular term refer. Here, I explore the interaction between this classic problem in the analytic tradition’s history and a contemporary view about the interpretation of higher-order logic, developing a higher-order Fregean semantics and metaphysics that is immune to the problem. At the heart of my approach is a seemingly anti-Fregean semantic framework that appears to withhold reference from predicates. I argue (§ 2) that this appearance is misleading: from a higher-order perspective, this seemingly anti-Fregean semantics can be seen to treat predicates referentially. After articulating the conception of higher-order logic on which this argument depends (§3), I show how to combine this approach with other central principles of Fregean semantics and metaphysics without giving rise to the concept horse problem (§4). I then (§5) address a prominent style of objection to views of broadly this kind, versions of which are due to Oystein Linnebo, Bob Hale, and Crispin Wright. The lesson is that the concept horse problem for Fregean conceptions of predicate reference—and of the language-reality relationship more generally—and their apparent conflict with non-referential treatments of predicates, both stem from a failure to take seriously the existential import of higherorder quantification alongside unwarranted insistence on formulating Fregean semantics in first-order terms.
DOI：
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552238.003.0037
发表时间：
2008
期刊：
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影响因子：
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作者：
Smith B
通讯作者：
Smith B
作为形而上学的模态逻辑
DOI：
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
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影响因子：
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作者：
Williamson T
通讯作者：
Williamson T