Evolution of cooperation on stochastic dynamical networks.

Evolution of cooperation on stochastic dynamical networks.
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随机动态网络合作的演化

DOI:
10.1371/journal.pone.0011187
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发表时间:
2010-06-30
期刊:
影响因子:
3.7
通讯作者:
Traulsen A
Traulsen A
中科院分区:
综合性期刊3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Wu B;Zhou D;Fu F;Luo Q;Wang L;Traulsen A

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以牺牲自己为代价来增加他人适应性的合作行为,只有在存在额外机制的情况下,才能被自然选择所促进。一种这样的机制是基于人口结构,这可以导致集群的合作代理。最近,焦点已经转向复杂的动态种群结构,如社交网络,其中节点代表个人,链接代表社会关系。我们研究如何动态的社会网络可以改变网络中的合作水平。个体要么通过模仿他们的伴侣来更新他们的策略,要么调整他们的社会关系。对于网络结构的动力学,选择随机链接,并以相邻个体确定的概率断开。一旦它被打破,一个新的就建立起来了。这种链接动态可以方便地由一个马尔可夫链的配置空间中的不断变化的网络相互作用的代理。我们的模型可以分析解决提供的动态的链接收益比动态的战略。这导致了一个简单的合作演化规则:合作参与者和非合作参与者之间的联系越脆弱(或者合作者之间的联系越强大),合作就越有可能盛行。我们的方法可以铺平道路,分析研究战略和结构的共同进化。
Cooperative behavior that increases the fitness of others at a cost to oneself can be promoted by natural selection only in the presence of an additional mechanism. One such mechanism is based on population structure, which can lead to clustering of cooperating agents. Recently, the focus has turned to complex dynamical population structures such as social networks, where the nodes represent individuals and links represent social relationships. We investigate how the dynamics of a social network can change the level of cooperation in the network. Individuals either update their strategies by imitating their partners or adjust their social ties. For the dynamics of the network structure, a random link is selected and breaks with a probability determined by the adjacent individuals. Once it is broken, a new one is established. This linking dynamics can be conveniently characterized by a Markov chain in the configuration space of an ever-changing network of interacting agents. Our model can be analytically solved provided the dynamics of links proceeds much faster than the dynamics of strategies. This leads to a simple rule for the evolution of cooperation: The more fragile links between cooperating players and non-cooperating players are (or the more robust links between cooperators are), the more likely cooperation prevails. Our approach may pave the way for analytically investigating coevolution of strategy and structure.
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