Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions
Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions
复制标题
首价头寸拍卖的表现力和稳健性
DOI：
10.1145/2600057.2602846
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
D. Parkes
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Paul Dütting;Felix A. Fischer;D. Parkes
理想的经济机制是，其性质在多个均衡和关于参与者可获得的信息的不同假设下以稳健的方式保持。本文主要研究在完全信息和不完全信息两种情况下，头寸拍卖的设计和在每个有效均衡下保证高收益的机制。我们的主要结果确定，具有多维出价的广义第一价格拍卖是唯一能够实现这一目标的标准设计，即使估值是一维的。超越估值空间的表现力是健壮性所必需的，这一事实与以前的工作形成了有趣的对比，以前的工作突出了简单竞价空间的好处。从技术角度来看，我们的结果很有趣，因为它们建立了多维竞价空间的均衡存在，其中建立均衡存在的标准技术失效了。
It is desirable for an economic mechanism that its properties hold in a robust way across multiple equilibria and under varying assumptions regarding the information available to the participants. In this paper we focus on the design of position auctions and seek mechanisms that guarantee high revenue in every efficient equilibrium under both complete and incomplete information. Our main result identifies a generalized first-price auction with multi-dimensional bids as the only standard design capable of achieving this goal, even though valuations are one-dimensional. The fact that expressiveness beyond the valuation space is necessary for robustness provides an interesting counterpoint to previous work, which has highlighted the benefits of simple bid spaces. From a technical perspective, our results are interesting because they establish equilibrium existence for a multi-dimensional bid space, where standard techniques for establishing equilibrium existence break down.
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00517.x
发表时间：
2005-12
期刊：
Macroeconomics eJournal
影响因子：
--
作者：
Heidrun C. Hoppe-Wewetzer;B. Moldovanu;A. Sela
通讯作者：
Heidrun C. Hoppe-Wewetzer;B. Moldovanu;A. Sela