Privatisation and Timing in a Mixed Oligopoly with Both Foreign and Domestic Firms
Privatisation and Timing in a Mixed Oligopoly with Both Foreign and Domestic Firms
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国内外企业混合寡头垄断中的私有化和时机
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-8454.2009.00379.x
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Guangliang Ye
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Heywood;Guangliang Ye
本文对国内和国外私营企业的混合寡头垄断进行了建模，并研究了数量设定博弈中由此产生的时机。我们证明，通过单个同时进行的赛前延迟阶段，所产生的内生时间要么是上市公司领先，要么是两家私营公司领先。赛前阶段的另一种特征导致了两家私营公司领先、上市公司跟随的单一时机。对于所有内生出现的时机，我们表明私有化总是会降低国内福利，但其对全球福利的影响是模糊的。
This paper models a mixed oligopoly with both a domestic and a foreign private firm and examines the resulting timing in the quantity setting game. We demonstrate that with a single simultaneous pre-game delay stage, the resulting endogenous timing has either the public firm leading or the two private firms leading. An alternative characterisation of the pre-game stage results in the single timing in which the two private firms lead and the public firm follows. For all timings that emerge endogenously, we show that privatisation will always lower domestic welfare but its influence on global welfare is ambiguous.
影响因子：
1.9
作者：
Toshihiro Matsumura
通讯作者：
Toshihiro Matsumura