Game theory of social distancing in response to an epidemic.
Game theory of social distancing in response to an epidemic.
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DOI：
10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000793
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发表时间：
2010-05-27
影响因子：
4.3
通讯作者：
Reluga TC
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Reluga TC
社交距离做法是通过减少易感个体与可能传播疾病的感染个体之间的接触率来预防疾病传播的行为变化。保持社交距离的做法可以降低流行病的严重程度，但社交距离的好处取决于个人使用的程度。个人有时不愿意支付社会距离所固有的成本，这可能会限制其作为控制措施的有效性。本文提出了一个微分博弈，以确定个人如何最好地利用社会距离和相关的自我保护行为在流行病。流行病是由一个简单的，良好的混合常微分方程模型。我们使用微分博弈来研究社会距离作为缓解措施的潜在价值，通过计算各种成本函数下的均衡行为。数值方法被用来计算一种流行病的总成本下的平衡行为作为一个函数的时间大规模接种疫苗，流行病识别。分析的关键参数是基本再生产数和社会距离基线效率。结果表明，当基本繁殖数在2左右时，社会距离对个体最有利。在没有疫苗接种或其他干预措施的情况下，最佳社交距离永远不会收回超过30%的感染成本。我们还展示了随着社会距离和检测效率的提高，疫苗开发的机会之窗如何延长。在流行病期间，人们降低感染风险的最简单方法之一是减少与感染者的接触率。然而，这些行动的价值取决于疫情如何发展。迄今为止，很少有关于行为变化的分析能够解释行为变化如何改变流行病浪潮。在本文中，我计算了日常社交距离行为与现在和未来感染风险降低之间的权衡。随后的分析表明，对于研究的参数和函数形式，社会距离是最有用的中度传染性疾病。当社会距离不昂贵时，它特别有用，可以推迟流行，直到疫苗广泛使用。然而，在没有疫苗的情况下，对于高传染性疾病，保持社会距离的好处很小。
Social distancing practices are changes in behavior that prevent disease transmission by reducing contact rates between susceptible individuals and infected individuals who may transmit the disease. Social distancing practices can reduce the severity of an epidemic, but the benefits of social distancing depend on the extent to which it is used by individuals. Individuals are sometimes reluctant to pay the costs inherent in social distancing, and this can limit its effectiveness as a control measure. This paper formulates a differential-game to identify how individuals would best use social distancing and related self-protective behaviors during an epidemic. The epidemic is described by a simple, well-mixed ordinary differential equation model. We use the differential game to study potential value of social distancing as a mitigation measure by calculating the equilibrium behaviors under a variety of cost-functions. Numerical methods are used to calculate the total costs of an epidemic under equilibrium behaviors as a function of the time to mass vaccination, following epidemic identification. The key parameters in the analysis are the basic reproduction number and the baseline efficiency of social distancing. The results show that social distancing is most beneficial to individuals for basic reproduction numbers around 2. In the absence of vaccination or other intervention measures, optimal social distancing never recovers more than 30% of the cost of infection. We also show how the window of opportunity for vaccine development lengthens as the efficiency of social distancing and detection improve. One of the easiest ways for people to lower their risk of infection during an epidemic is for them to reduce their rate of contact with infectious individuals. However, the value of such actions depends on how the epidemic progresses. Few analyses of behavior change to date have accounted for how changes in behavior change the epidemic wave. In this paper, I calculate the tradeoff between daily social distancing behavior and reductions in infection risk now and in the future. The subsequent analysis shows that, for the parameters and functional forms studied, social distancing is most useful for moderately transmissible diseases. Social distancing is particularly useful when it is inexpensive and can delay the epidemic until a vaccine becomes widely available. However, the benefits of social distancing are small for highly transmissible diseases when no vaccine is available.
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影响因子：
4.3
作者：
Del Valle, S;Hethcote, H;Castillo-Chavez, C
通讯作者：
Castillo-Chavez, C
影响因子：
2.8
作者：
Hyman, James M.;Li, Jia
通讯作者：
Li, Jia
DOI：
10.1073/pnas.0810762106
发表时间：
2009-04-21
影响因子：
11.1
作者：
Funk, Sebastian;Gilad, Erez;Jansen, Vincent A. A.
通讯作者：
Jansen, Vincent A. A.
影响因子：
1.4
作者：
Chen, FH
通讯作者：
Chen, FH
影响因子：
4.3
作者：
Reluga, Timothy C.;Bauch, Chris T.;Galvani, Alison P.
通讯作者：
Galvani, Alison P.