Sellers with Misspecified Models
Sellers with Misspecified Models
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型号错误的卖家
DOI：
10.1093/restud/rdw030
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. Prat
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kristóf Madarász;A. Prat
委托人经常根据代理人偏好的错误模型进行操作。当偏好是这样的，非局部激励约束可能约束在最优时，即使对偏好的轻微错误说明也会导致巨大且不会消失的损失。相反，我们提出了一个两步方案，其中主体：(1)识别模型最优菜单；(2)通过与代理商分享固定比例的利润来调整价格，如果商品以模型最优价格出售，她将获得利润。我们证明了她的损失是有界的，并且随着模型收敛到真理平滑地消失。最后，没有(2)这样的共享规则的两步机制不会产生有效的近似。
Principals often operate on misspecified models of their agents’ preferences. When preferences are such that non-local incentive constraints may bind in the optimum, even slight misspecification of the preferences can lead to large and non-vanishing losses. Instead, we propose a two-step scheme whereby the principal: (1) identifies the model-optimal menu; and (2) modifies prices by offering to share with the agent a fixed proportion of the profit she would receive if an item were sold at the model-optimal price. We show that her loss is bounded and vanishes smoothly as the model converges to the truth. Finally, two-step mechanisms without a sharing rule like (2) will not yield a valid approximation.
事后实施的局限性
影响因子：
6.1
作者：
Jehiel;Philippe;Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn;Benny Moldovanu;William R. Zame
通讯作者：
William R. Zame