Exclusionary Pricing in Two-Sided Markets
Exclusionary Pricing in Two-Sided Markets
复制标题
双边市场的排他性定价
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3541834
复制
发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
T. Valletti
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Andrea Amelio;Liliane Giardino;T. Valletti
本文研究了双边市场条件下排他性定价行为的动机。平台是横向差异化的，寻求从活跃在同一平台上的相反用户群体的规模中吸引单家并享受间接网络外部性的两个群体的用户。进入者产生一个固定的进入成本，在位者可以在进入决策之前承诺其价格。因此，在位者可以选择要么接纳进入者，要么排除进入者并享受垄断利润，尽管有这样的限制，即其价格必须足够低，不给进入者留下任何空间来支付其进入的固定成本。我们发现，在限制定价文献的精神，在某些情况下，即使是平台发现有利可图的，以排除进入者，如果固定进入成本高于一定的门槛。通过研究阈值的性质，我们发现网络外部性越强，现有平台发现排除它是有利可图的阈值就越低。我们还发现，网络外部性越弱，两个平台的差异化程度越高，进入威慑就越有可能伤害消费者。
This paper studies the incentives to engage in exclusionary pricing in the context of two-sided markets. Platforms are horizontally differentiated, and seek to attract users of two groups who single-home and enjoy indirect network externalities from the size of the opposite user group active on the same platform. The entrant incurs a fixed cost of entry, and the incumbent can commit to its prices before the entry decision is taken. The incumbent has thus the option to either accommodate entry, or to exclude entry and enjoy monopolistic profits, albeit under the constraint that its price must be low enough to not leave any room for an entrant to cover its fixed cost of entry. We find that, in the spirit of the literature on limit pricing, under certain circumstances even platforms find it profitable to exclude entrants if the fixed entry cost lies above a certain threshold. By studying the properties of the threshold, we show that the stronger the network externality, the lower the thresholds for which incumbent platforms find it profitable to exclude. We also find that entry deterrence is more likely to harm consumers the weaker are network externalities, and the more differentiated are the two platforms.
细分与聚集：平台与卖家之间的竞争
影响因子：
8.2
作者：
Martin Peitz;Markus Reisinger
通讯作者：
Markus Reisinger